Deductibility of Expenses for Conventions and Educational Seminars by Postlewaite, Philip F.




Deductibility of Expenses for Conventions and
Educational Seminars
Philip F. Postlewaite
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Postlewaite, Philip F., "Deductibility of Expenses for Conventions and Educational Seminars" (1977). Minnesota Law Review. 2087.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2087
Deductibility of Expenses for Conventions
and Educational Seminars
Philip F. Postlewaite*
The development of discount charter flights and reduced
group accommodation rates in recent years has made travel more
accessible to more people and has affected the pattern of business
meetings, conventions, and educational seminars that business-
men and professionals attend. Groups frequently schedule their
conventions in foreign locales or in American cities that are far
from their members' residences or unrelated to the group's busi-
ness activities. Excellent examples are the American Bar Associ-
ation's 1971 and 1975 conventions in London and Montreal, and
numerous state bar association conventions.' These conventions
normally involve programs covering broad topics relevant to the
participants' vocation, as well as meetings and discussions by par-
ticipants concerning their specialties.
The newest vehicle for conducting such activities is the "edu-
cational seminar." Generally geared to professional groups, the
seminar often consists of a series of meetings spaced over a two
to three week period and usually follows one of these formats:
(1) the seminar group flies to different locales where local pro-
fessionals or government officials lecture on various aspects of
the participants' general or specialized area of expertise;2 or (2)
the group travels by ship, accompanied by "experts" who period-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame School
of Law.
1. The Washington State Bar proposed holding its annual conven-
tion in San Francisco, California, but moved it to Vancouver, British Co-
lumbia. See Seattle Times, Sept. 11, 1973, at 4, col. 6. The following year's
meeting was proposed for Honolulu, Hawaii. A group of Certified Public
Accountants from the Washington and Oregon state associations held
their annual meeting in San Francisco, California, see [1976] FED. TAXES
(P-H) 1 60,341. Numerous other examples of the "remote locale syn-
drome" could be found by reviewing the convention or seminar sites for
established associations for the past five years.
2. Examples of these activities abound, but two familiar to the au-
thor will be described in detail. In 1974 a group of attorneys in Wash-
ington organized a "People to People" trip for Washington lawyers,
judges, and their spouses. The trip was to take 21 days with stops in
Budapest, Athens (via Vienna), Moscow, Leningrad, Belgrade, and Lon-
don. The cover letter soliciting participation stated: "It is anticipated
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ically lecture to the participants.3 Both formats provide much
free time and may include organized sightseeing.
The interest in these professional meetings is frequently
based on a desire to combine business with pleasure, coupled
with the hope of qualifying the expenses as federal income tax
deductions. While promoters of such events may or may not con-
sider and advertise the deductibility of these expenses, the partic-
ipants, who may lack sufficient knowledge of the federal income
tax law, are likely to believe that any business relationship what-
soever will justify a tax deduction. This tax-saving motivation
has undoubtedly led to the increased participation in these activi-
ties.
The federal executive, judicial, and legislative branches have
all expressed concern that the tax laws in this area may be sub-
ject to abuse. The Tax Court recently disallowed the expenses
of attending a foreign medical seminar.4 The Internal Revenue
Service then issued a Revenue Ruling involving similar facts and
concluded that such expenses were nondeductible personal ex-
penditures. 5 Most recently, Congress restricted deductions for
the expenses of attending conventions and educational seminars
held outside the United States.6 This legislation limits the
number of deductible conventions and the amount of expenses
allowable. 7 This Article will focus on the deductibility of
expenses related to both domestic and foreign educational sem-
inars and conventions. The current criteria for deductibility
that approximately 50 percent of our time will be devoted to meetings
with our counterparts, their wives, and exploring their legal and judicial
facilities. This will be interspersed with sightseeing and free time." Al-
though not a bar-sponsored trip, permission to promote the trip was
sought and received from the Board of Governors.
Another seminar was sponsored by the Texas Medical Association.
Members were enrolled in a three-week program providing "professional
experiences" in Africa. A number of stops in various African cities were
planned, and at each stop professional lectures were presented by local
doctors or health officials. Also available to participants were tours of
local medical facilities. During "free time" members could participate
in organized sightseeing tours, including safaris. See also Esfandiar Ka-
divar, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1973); Rev. Rul. 74-292, 1974-1 C.B. 43, dis-
cussed in detail in text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
3. See Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 79-82 infra.
4. Esfandiar Kadivar, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1973), discussed in
text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
5. Rev. Rul. 74-292, 1974-1 C.B. 43.
6. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 602, 90 Stat. 1590.
See text accompanying notes 130-45.
7. See note 133 infra for text of the new legislation regarding de-
ductibility of expenses incurred in attending a foreign convention,
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contained in the Regulations will be explored and the historical
evolution of the deductibility of such expenditures analyzed.
Modern case law, recent administrative pronouncements, and the
new foreign convention legislation will also be reviewed. This
divergent material will be interpreted and synthesized into a
workable test for the deductibility of such expenses.8
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY GROUND RULES
Expenses generally incurred in attending a convention or
seminar may be categorized as follows: (1) travel to and from
the site of the meeting; (2) registration and participation (ex-
penses directly attributable to attendance and participation at
meetings, and booklets, outlines, and other similar materials);
(3) lodging and meals (those while in transit to and from the
site, as well as those while in attendance); and (4) personal ex-
penses (such as sightseeing or nonbusiness entertainment). If
any of these expenditures are deductible, the taxpayer's tax lia-
bility is reduced. While the dollar value of a tax deduction de-
pends on the taxpayer's bracket, the United States Treasury
underwrites a portion of any deductible expense by a concomi-
tant loss of tax revenue. The determination of the circumstances
under which these expenses warrant deductibility is thus an im-
portant step toward ensuring equitable treatment of the nation's
taxpayers.9
With the exception of foreign conventions governed by the
new legislation, the Internal Revenue Code does not specifically
deal with the expenses of attending a convention or educational
seminar. Section 162, however, permits a deduction of "ordinary
and necessary" business expenses, which specifically include trav-
el expenses, including meals and lodging.10 If the convention
8. As will be seen, much confusion exists regarding the criteria for
deductibility. Various types of expenditures are incurred by a partici-
pant attending conventions or seminars, including the costs of regis-
tration and educational material (the "educational" portion), and travel.
This Article will focus primarily on treatment of these issues in the con-
text of group activity. Numerous opinions on education and travel ex-
pense deductibility have involved single taxpayers-for example, a tax-
payer returning to college or graduate school for additional education or
traveling to meet with a client in a distant place. This Article, however,
will be limited to the deductibility of expenditures incurred for group ac-
tivities of short duration-conventions and seminars.
9. It is clearly unfair to force some taxpayers to subsidize the va-
cations of others.
10. The Code provides a deduction for "traveling expenses (includ-
ing amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which
are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from
home in the pursuit of a trade or business. . . ." I.R.C. § 162 (a) (2).
19771
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
or seminar occurs outside the United States, expenses are further
subject to the special allocation rules of sections 274(c) & (h),11
which theoretically do not come into play until the expenses are
first found deductible under section 162.12 To comply with sec-
tion 162, the taxpayer must show that he engaged in the activity
for business reasons (that is, that the activity was not a section
262 personal expenditure), and that the expense was "ordinary
and necessary."
The Regulations appear to assume that the "ordinary and
necessary" requirement is obvious, for they do not address that
issue. They do deal specifically with some types of expenses that
may be deductible, including travel expenses. The Regulations
provide generally that the term "travel expenses" includes the
costs of transportation, meals, lodging, and related incidental ex-
penditures. If the travel is for personal, nonbusiness purposes,
then, consistent with section 262,13 none of the expenses'are de-
ductible; but if the trip is solely for business, all reasonable trav-
eling expenditures are deductible. 4 Most convention and sem-
inar trips, however, include personal and recreational activity
as well as business activity, and each case therefore presents a
twofold problem: (1) classifying the activities as "business" or
"personal," and (2) applying the standards for deductibility to
the classified activities.
The Regulations do not provide clear solutions to these prob-
lems. Travel expenses incurred on a combined personal and
11. See notes 12 & 133 infra.
12. "In the case of any individual who travels outside the United
States away from home in pursuit of a trade or business .... no deduc-
tion shall be allowed under section 162 . .. for that portion of the ex-
penses of such travel otherwise allowable under such section which...
is not allocable to such trade or business ... " I.R.C. § 274(c) (1) (em-
phasis added).
13. I.R.C. § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses."
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1958) provides:
Traveling expenses include travel fares, meals and lodging,
and expenses incident to travel such as expenses for sample
rooms, telephone and telegraph, public stenographers, etc. Only
such traveling expenses as are reasonable and necessary in the
conduct of the taxpayer's business and directly attributable to
it may be deducted. If the trip is undertaken for other than
business purposes, the travel fares and expenses incident to
travel are personal expenses and the meals and lodging are liv-
ing expenses. If the trip is solely on business, the reasonable
and necessary traveling expenses, including travel fares, meals




business trip are deductible only if the trip is "related pri-
marily to the taxpayer's trade or business."' 5 Whether the
trip is so related is determined by the "facts and circum-
stances" of each case.16 The relative allocation of time between
the taxpayer's personal and business activities is an "important
factor" in the "primarily related" test.I" Since the Regulations
discuss no additional factors it appears that, in the Treasury's
view, the relative time factor is determinative or, at least, creates
a presumption that can be rebutted only by presenting additional
factors. This quantitative approach apparently requires a tax-
payer to spend a majority of his time in business activities in
order to satisfy the "primarily related" test.'8
The Regulations further provide that the deductibility of
convention expenses depends upon "whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the taxpayer's trade or business and his at-
tendance at the convention or other meeting so that he is benefit-
ing or advancing the interests of his trade or business by such
attendance."'19 In other words, a sufficient relationship between
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958) provides:
If a taxpayer travels to a destination and while at such des-
tination engages in both business and personal activities, travel-
ing expenses to and from such destination are deductible only if
the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business.
If the trip is primarily personal in nature, the traveling expenses
to and from the destination are not deductible even though the
taxpayer engages in business activities while at such destination.
However, expenses while at the destination which are properly
allocable to the taxpayer's trade or business are deductible even
though the traveling expenses to and from the destination are
not deductible.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (2) (1958) provides:
Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade
or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on the
facts and circumstances in each case. The amount of time dur-
ing the period of the trip which is spent on personal activity
compared to the amount of time spent on activities directly re-
lating to the taxpayer's trade or business is an important factor
in determining whether the trip is primarily personal. If, for
example, a taxpayer spends one week while at a destination on
activities which are directly related to his trade or business and
subsequently spends an additional five weeks for vacation or
other personal activities, the trip will be considered primarily
personal in nature in the absence of a clear showing to the con-
trary.
17. See note 16 supra. See also Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55,
56 (Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (b) (1)'s distinction regarding allocation between
personal and business purposes should by analogy also apply to expenses
of seeking new employment when part of the trip is spent on personal
activities).
18. The Regulations seem to incorporate a quantitative approach,
but a more subjective approach could arguably be used. See text ac-
companying notes 163-79 infra.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1958) (emphasis added). This stand-
ard is hereinafter referred to as the "sufficient relationship" test.
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the convention and the taxpayer's business must exist before any
expenditure is deductible and before any comparison with non-
deductible personal expenses can be made. A taxpayer might
argue that the convention provision, because of its specificity,
should preempt the "primarily related" test, but that would
establish an easier standard for deducting travel expenses in a
convention context than in other areas. Were that argument ac-
cepted, deductions based on a disproportionate nonbusiness time
allocation would be condoned, which is contrary to the general
travel provisions and clearly an unwarranted interpretation of
the Regulations. Consequently, the sufficient relationship test
can logically be applied only as a threshold test. If the conven-
tion meets that standard, registration expenses and the costs of
meals and lodging allocable to business activity at the convention
will be deductible,20 but the expenses of traveling to and from
the convention will be governed by the "primarily related" test.
If a taxpayer attends an educational seminar rather than a
convention, a natural inquiry is whether the educational expense
Regulations 21 require a different result. Deductions for edu-
cation expenses, as for convention expenditures, are not specifi-
cally authorized by statute, but originated in judicial decisions, 22
and eventually appeared in the Regulations in 1958.23 The gen-
eral requirements for deducting educational expenses are that
the education maintain or improve a taxpayer's business skills
or meet an employer's requirements for continued employment. 24
Even expenditures meeting these tests will not be deductible,
however, if they qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business
or enable him to meet the minimum educational requirements
for his job. 25  Once these prerequisites are met, direct ex-
penditures (for example, tuition and books) for the education
are deductible.
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958), note 15 supra, which
provides that even if travel expenditures are not allowable due to their
failure to meet the "primarily related" test, "expenses properly alloca-
ble" to the taxpayer's business are deductible. Included in this category
are meals and lodging for those days during which the convention is in
session. If only a portion of the convention is relevant to the taxpayer's
business, meals and lodging expenses may be subject to allocation. See
notes 158-60 infra and accompanying text.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a) (1958).
22. See notes 63-64 infra and accompanying text.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958).
24. Id. §§ 1.162-5(a)(1)-(2).
25. Id. §§ 1.162-5(b) (1)-(3).
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As would be expected, however, the Regulations also permit
deduction of incidental educational expenses.26 These provisions
are strikingly reminiscent of the "primarily related" travel Regu-
lations. Expenses for travel, meals, and lodging (expenditures
covered under the section 1.162-2 travel Regulations) incurred
while obtaining a business education are deductible. On the
other hand, primarily personal travel expenses are not deduct-
ible.27 As in the travel Regulations, the facts and circumstances
of the case determine the taxpayer's primary purpose, and the
relative amount of time spent in personal and educational activ-
ities receives special emphasis. 28 Furthermore, the travel Regu-
lations are incorporated by reference. 29
The similarity of the terms, tests, and functions of the educa-
tion and travel regulations indicate that the same standard
should be used to determine the deductibility of travel expenses
under both Regulations.3 0  Travel that is primarily related to
business, as determined by "facts and circumstances" (especially
the relative time allocated to business activities), will be deduct-
ible under one Regulation or the other depending on the char-
acter of the business activity. A more liberal construction of
26. Id. §§ 1.162-5(e)(1)-(2).
27. The Regulations provide:
Travel away from home. (1) If an individual travels away
from home primarily to obtain education, the expenses of which
are deductible under this section, his expenditures for travel,
meals and lodging while away from home are deductible. How-
ever, if as an incident of such trip the individual engages in some
personal activity such as sightseeing, social visiting or entertain-
ing, or other recreation, the portion of the expenses attributable
to such personal activity constitutes nondeductible personal or
living expenses and is not allowable as a deduction. If the in-
dividual's travel away from home is primarily personal, the in-
dividual's expenditures for travel, meals and lodging (other than
meals and lodging during the time spent in participating in de-
ductible education pursuits) are not deductible. Whether a par-
ticular trip is primarily personal or primarily to obtain educa-
tion the expenses of which are deductible under this section de-
pends upon all the facts and circumstances of each case. An
important factor to be taken into consideration in making the
determination is the relative amount of time devoted to personal
activity as compared with the time devoted to educational pur-
suits. The rules set forth in this paragraph are subject to the
provisions of section 162 (a) (2), relating to deductibility of cer-
tain traveling expenses, and section 274(c) and (d), relating to
allocation of certain foreign travel expenses and substantiation
required, respectively, and the regulations thereunder.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (e) (1) (1958) (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See also Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Ex-




deductibility standards under the education Regulations would
merely encourage taxpayers to re-label conventions as educa-
tional seminars and thus would require the development of an-
other set of standards to prevent such abuse. As long as the
activity has the requisite relation to the taxpayer's business, the
practical differences between a convention and a seminar are not
sufficient to warrant different tax treatment.
Thus, regardless of the label affixed, a convention or educa-
tional seminar is initially scrutinized under the "sufficient rela-
tionship" standard in order to ascertain whether the activity is
related to the taxpayer's trade or business. 31 If it is, the registra-
tion expense and some portion of the cost of meals and lodging
while in attendance will be deductible. Travel expenses to and
from the activity will be deductible only if the "primarily related"
test, determined by the facts and circumstances, with particular
emphasis on the relative time allotted to business and pleasure,
is met. If the activity is not sufficiently related to the taxpayer's
trade or business, no deduction will be allowed.
This current administrative standard for deductibility, cou-
pled with the author's interpretation of substantial ambiguities,
has been presented in order to describe what appears to be ideal
administrative practice. Administrative standards, however, are
subject to judicial interpretations that often differ significantly
from administrative intent. Such interpretations are frequently
influenced by the history and evolution of the particular issue
or doctrine being scrutinized. Thus, an examination of the
history of the deductibility of convention and seminar expenses
will provide both a useful comparison of the current law with
its origin and an indication of its future evolution.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT, 1919-1956
The Treasury initially contested the deductibility of conven-
tion expenses, and the issue spawned an early flurry of litiga-
tion.32 Although the revenue act then in effect allowed deduc-
31. Although the education and travel regulations use different lan-
guage, the requirement that an educational expenditure maintain or im-
prove the taxpayer's business skills performs the same function as the
requirement that a convention have a sufficient relationship to the tax-
payer's trade or business. This Article will refer to both requirements
as the "sufficient relationship" test.
32. There is little material or precedent from this early period on
educational seminars, perhaps because they were labeled and treated as
"conventions." See text accompanying note 62 infra.
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tions for traveling expenses,83 the Revenue Service, in a cryptic
ruling, deemed convention expenses nondeductible: "Amounts
expended by a physician for railroad and Pullman fares and hotel
bills in attending a medical convention were not ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in the pursuit of his profession and
do not constitute allowable deductions in his return."8 4 Simi-
larly, a college teacher who had done research that afforded aca-
demic and professional recognition, but did not affect his salary,
was denied a deduction for travel expenses incurred in attending
meetings of scientific societies on the ground that a personal ex-
penditure was involved.3 5
Educational expenditures suffered a similar fate. In a one
sentence opinion the Service disallowed educational travel ex-
penditures: "Expenses incurred by doctors in taking post-grad-
uate courses are deemed to be in the nature of personal expenses
and not deductible."36 Taxpayers seeking such deductions had to
overcome both the Treasury's previously established position re-
garding group attendance activities,37 and its general reluctance
to recognize educational expenses as deductions, a problem that
was not resolved until the late 1940s and 1950s.38
Concomitant with the Service's disallowance of these ex-
penditures, the deductibility of travel expenses became a cause
celebre in the Senate. The Revenue Act of 1921 first authorized
a deduction for "traveling expenses" for all taxpayers.3 9 The
provision equalized a previously discriminatory distinction be-
33. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 239 (now
I.R.C. § 162 (a) (2)).
34. I.T. 1369, I-1 C.B. 123 (1922), revoked, I.T. 2602, X-2 C.B.
130 (1931).
35. LT. 1520, 1-2 C.B. 145 (1922), recommended for revocation,
G.C.M. 11654, XII-1 C.B. 250 (1933), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-43,
1969-1 C.B. 310.
36. O.D. 984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-
31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
37. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
38. See text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
39. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 239 (now
I.R.C. § 162(a) (2)) provides:
That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensa-
tion for personal services actually rendered; traveling expenses(including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging)
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business;
and rentals or other payments required to be made as a condi-
tion to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade
or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or
is not taking title or in which he has no equity;
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tween salaried employees and traveling salesmen.40  Although
the Senate Finance Committee report implied that the new pro-
vision merely reflected current law,4 1 the codification provided
a greater degree of certainty and gave taxpayers another basis
for maintaining that expenditures incurred in attending conven-
tions were deductible, as long as the "pursuit of a trade or busi-
ness" requirement could be met.
After this codification of general travel expense deductibility,
the issue of travel expenses in connection with conventions and
seminars did not arise again until 1925, when the Board of Tax
Appeals in Marion D. Shutter42 held that a clergyman's expenses
of traveling to a clerical convention were deductible. Like the
earlier cryptic rulings of the Treasury, this decision was devoid
of explanation, rationale, or citation of authorities. Travel ex-
penses were allowed, but direct expenses, such as meals and lodg-
ing purchased at the convention, were denied because the tax-
payer failed to substantiate his claim.
In Everett S. Lain,43 although disallowing the convention ex-
penses of a physician as inadequately substantiated, the Board
discussed a possible justification for such deductions-the "refer-
ral theory." Since contacts and acquaintances made at such
meetings could financially benefit the taxpayer, the convention
could be considered business-related. The Board reasoned that
the partnership to a large extent secures its patients through
acquaintances in the medical profession who are general prac-
titioners or specialists in other lines of medicine, and who send
to the partnership patients in need of the particular kind of
service that the partnership renders. Such acquaintances in the
profession are made by the partners by attending meetings and
conventions of medical societies.44
In its next significant decision, the Board set forth another
possible rationale for permitting convention deductions. In
Alexander Silverman45 the convention travel and participation
expenses of a scientist were allowed:
As the head of the department of chemistry, it was expected of
and incumbent on him as such to keep abreast in his particular
40. See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1921); 61 CONG.
REC. 5201 (1921) (remarks of Mr. Hawley).
41. Id.
42. 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925).
43. 3 B.T.A. 1157 (1926).
44. Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).




field of work and in touch with other scientists in the same field,
which was done among other ways by the preparation and pub-
lication of papers, by the reading of technical periodicals, and
by the attendance at such conventions where consideration of
subjects of a scientific nature were presented and discussed.46
This decision directly conflicted with the Treasury's position
47
and was the first to articulate a rationale for the deductibility
of convention expenses based on the relationship of the substance
of the meeting to the taxpayer's trade or business-the "educa-
tional advancement" theory.
Notwithstanding the Board's position favoring deduction of
convention expenses, the Service remained intransigent. This
stance drew congressional concern in various hearings on the 1926
and 1928 revenue acts.48  The Senate Finance Committee pro-
posed an amendment to section 23 (a) of the 1928 act which would
have allowed expenses "in attending meetings of trades, profes-
sional, or business organizations of which the taxpayer is a mem-
ber. '49 The amendment was deleted in conference, however,
because the conunittee, ignoring the rationale advanced in Silver-
man, concluded that such a provision would authorize "nonbusi-
ness" deductions. 5-
Regardless of the congressional failure to expand the scope
of deductibility, Silverman and Lain provided ammunition for
subsequent taxpayers by establishing the two major bases for
deducting convention expenses-the referral and educational
theories. The deduction became established notwithstanding
these different policy justifications, and despite the Service's con-
46. Id. at 1329.
47. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
48. See Statement of C.W. Richardson, in REPORT OF HousE COMM.
ON WAYs Am MEANs, 68TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON REVENUE RMvi-
sION, 1925 part 3, at 147 (Comm. Print 1925); statement of W.C. Wood-
ward, id. at 152. Interestingly, during the debate regarding the 1926 act,
members of the Senate expressed concern about the location of conven-
tions and seminars and the possibility that the expense deductions would
be used to underwrite exotic vacations. Senator Smoot, responding to
an inquiry about expenses connected with a physician's attendance at
"special courses of lectures or special courses in hospitals for the devel-
opment of their professional ability" responded:
The committee had this matter under consideration and gave it
considerable thought. After looking over the correspondence,
they decided that such expenses were not covered, and not only
that, but the committee decided that it would be a very unwise
thing to comply with the request and include them. If it is done
with the doctors, it ought to be done with the attorneys and it
ought to be done with every profession. And where will they
go? Will they go to Europe, or where?
67 CONG. Rnc. 3022-23 (1926) (emphasis added).
49. Amendments 26-28 to -. R. 1, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
50. H.R. REP. No. 1882, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1928).
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tinued opposition. In Cecil M. Jack,5 a physician was allowed
a deduction by the Board for the expenses of attending medical
conventions. The opinion was devoid of legal reasoning, but it
cited Shutter and Silverman as grounds for allowing the deduc-
tions. The Jack decision was quickly followed by similar opin-
ions in J. Bently Squier,5 2 Wade H. Ellis,53 Roy Upham,54 and
Robert L. Coffey.55 While these opinions consistently allowed
the taxpayer's traveling expenses to the conventions and those
incurred in actual attendance, they did not explain the grounds
for the holdings or discuss the policy reasons for permitting such
deductions. Rather the cases appeared to assume that such ex-
penses were by definition within the concept of "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses. Thus, neither the education nor
the referral theory was clearly adopted as the rationale underly-
ing deductibility. At least a partial explanation for the courts'
reluctance to expressly rely on the educational theory may be
that the deductibility of education expenses per se was not firmly
established by the courts until 1950 or by the Regulations until
1958." 6
Following this series of defeats, the Service revoked its pre-
vious position 57 and ruled that "regular members of the associa-
tion may derive a business advantage from sending a representa-
tive to the annual convention .... The necessary expenses paid
or incurred constitute an allowable deduction for Federal income
51. 13 B.T.A. 726 (1928).
52. 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928).
53. 15 B.T.A. 1075 (1929), aff'd sub. nor. Ellis v. Burnet, 50 F.2d
343 (D.C. Cir. 1931). The Board's decision in Ellis indicated that the
educational aspects of an American Bar Association convention were con-
trolling. The Board allowed deductions for expenses incurred at a do-
mestic convention, but simultaneously disallowed deduction for any ex-
penses incurred on a subsequent trip to Europe, stating that "[t]he pur-
pose of the trip to Europe was not to serve or educate [the taxpayer]
but to secure information for the Bar Association." Id. at 1076. The
appellate court affirmed the denial of deductions for the foreign travel
expenditures, holding that those expenditures "had no tendency to in-
crease [taxpayer's] professional income." 50 F.2d at 344.
54. 16 B.T.A 950 (1929). The taxpayer maintained that the con-
vention expenses were deductible either under the "ordinary and neces-
sary" test or, because of his position as an officer of the charitable or-
ganization sponsoring the convention, as a charitable contribution. The
Board appears to have based its opinion on the latter rationale.
55. 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931).
56. See Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), rev'g
13 T.C. 291 (1949); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958). See also Halperin, supra
note 30, at 899-903.
57. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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tax purposes."581 With the issuance of this new interpretation, the
Service, without qualification or limitations, withdrew its opposi-
tion to classifying convention expenses as "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenditures. The Service also revoked another
early interpretation of convention expense deductibility, 59 ex-
pressing its position in such broad language that the issue ap-
peared to be firmly settled, regardless of the subject matter,
scheduling, or length of the activity.
In view of the decisions and rulings above cited, it is clear
that I.T. 1520 is erroneous in holding that (1) expenditures in
connection with the publication of the results of investigation,
such as plates and figures for illustrative purposes, (2) deprecia-
tion on books and instruments purchased for use in research
work, and (3) expenses incurred when traveling for the purpose
of attending meetings of scientific societies, are personal ex-
penses. It is also apparent that expenditures (2) and (3) are
deductible from gross income .... It is the opinion of this
office that I.T. 1520 should be expressly revoked in so far as it
holds that the expenditures therein discussed are of a personal
nature.60
Minor litigation involving convention expenditures continued
throughout this early period,61 but educational seminar cases
58. I.T. 2602, X-2 C.B. 130-31 (1931), revoking IT. 1369, I-1 C.B.
123 (1922). Contrary to the factual situations represented in the earlier
interpretation and in all of the contested Board decisions, the new inter-
pretation dealt with expenses incurred by businesses in sending em-
ployee representatives to their sponsored convention. The purpose of
sending representatives was to further business interests; thus the new
interpretation authorized the deduction of convention expenses incurred
by the businesses themselves. Although the interpretation was thus ac-
curate from an employer's standpoint, it was inappropriate for revoking
the Service's previous convention-personal expenditure position. Al-
though the activity was analyzed for deductibility under a convention
test, the same result could have been upheld on a payment of compensa-
tion basis. As noted below in Thomas v. Patterson, 189 F. Supp. 230
(N.D. Ala. 1959), rev'd, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
837 (1961), discussed in text accompanying notes 83-99 infra, and in Ru-
dolf v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960), affd, 291 F.2d
841 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), cert. dismissed, 370 U.S.
269 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 100-04 infra, an expense
may be deductible to an employer whether or not the activity is deduct-
ible to the attending employee. An all expenses paid vacation provided
by an employer to an employee is almost invariably a deductible ex-
pense, unless it constitutes a gift. However, such expenditures at the
recipient-employee level are not necessarily deductible. Therefore, while
I.T. 2602 broadened convention expense deductibility to conform with the
Board's decisions, it was an inapt method of doing so.
59. G.C.M. 11654, XII-1 C.B. 250 (1933), revoking I.T. 1520 1-2 C.B.
145 (1922), see note 35 supra and accompanying text.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See Charles 0. Gunther, Jr., 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 984 (1954) (ex-
penses arising from attendance at accounting convention, producing busi-
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were sparse. This is probably both because the deductibility of
education expenses per se was unsettled, and because such activ-
ities were frequently characterized as "conventions" in light of
previous taxpayer success with that approach. 62
Nevertheless, one significant decision on educational semi-
nars was rendered during this period. Coughlin v. Commission-
er 63 concerned an Idaho attorney who handled most of his firm's
federal income tax matters and attended a two-week tax seminar
in New York City. The Second Circuit, emphasizing the enhance-
ment of the attorney's knowledge in his area of practice, con-
cluded that such expenditures were ordinary and necessary and
therefore deductible. The court noted further that the taxpayer
had a moral duty to his clientele to keep abreast of new develop-
ments. The Regulations' incorporation of the facts of Coughlin
attests to the significance of the decision.64
B. DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD, 1956-1969
With the basic issue of deductibility settled, the major ques-
tion became under what circumstances deductions would be al-
lowable. The necessity of drafting regulations under the 1954
Code gave the Service an opportunity to review its position. It ex-
pressed revived concern that the deductions might be abused:
Where opportunities exist for personal vacationing in con-
nection with business trips or the attendance of business or pro-
fessional conventions, and especially where the taxpayer is
accompanied by one or more members of his family, it is appar-
ent that examining officers of the Service have a duty to give
especially careful scrutiny to deductions taken in returns for the
expense involved in order to assure against abuse of the deduc-
tion permitted by section 162 (a) of the Code. 65
ness referrals, disallowed due to inadequate substantiation); Rita M. Cal-
liman, 12 T.C.IvL (CCH) 170 (1953) (secretarial convention in which the
Service tried to distinguish the established precedent due to the group's
nonprofessional composition; deduction of expenses were allowed be-
cause of educational purpose of elevating the members' standards); O.G.
Russell, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 334 (1952) (disallowing deduction of expenses
incurred in attending union meetings because of the predominate motiva-
tion failing to evidence a business purpose); J. Gordon Gaines, Inc., 10
T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1951) (trucking convention expenses allowed on
grounds of producing business); L.F. Ratterman, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 476
(1948) (upholding deduction of lumberman's convention expenses).
62. See text accompanying notes 42-47 & 51-55 supra.
63. 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (2) example (1) (1958). Coughlin was
followed in Bristline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1956),
which upheld an attorney's deductions of expenses incurred in traveling
to and attending a two-week Public Law Institute conference in New
York City.
65. Rev. Rul. 56-168, 1956-1 C.B. 93 (emphasis added).
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Reconsidering its previous carte blanche acquiescence in the de-
ductions, the Treasury more clearly defined allowable deductions
in the 1958 Regulations, which specifically addressed convention
expenses, travel expenses, and educational travel expenses.60
These Regulations, as described previously,6 7 were more specific
than the statute but did not completely resolve the issue of de-
ductibility, for they interpreted the law in terms that were them-
selves undefined. Further refinement was left to the Service and
the courts.
The Service has made several attempts to define the "suffici-
ent relationship" test promulgated in the 1958 Regulations. Rev-
enue Ruling 59-31668 noted that the proper standard was an
objective determination of whether a taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness, after taking into account his duties and responsibilities,
would benefit from the substantive material to be covered at the
convention. This could be determined by comparing the purpose
of the meeting as shown by the agenda with the taxpayer's
duties, but the Ruling clearly implies that other methods of proof
could also be used:
The allowance of deductions for convention expenses as busi-
ness expenses will depend upon whether the relationship be-
tween the taxpayer's trade or business and his attendance at the
convention is such that by his attendance he is benefiting or
advancing the interests of his trade or business.
One method of determining whether such a relationship
exists is to compare the individual's duties and responsibilities
of his own position with the purpose of the meeting as shown
by the program or agenda. If personal and business purposes
are both involved, a proper allocation must be made in accord-
ance with section 1.162-2 (b) of the Income Tax Regulations.69
This Ruling reflects the educational theory adopted by the Board
in Alexander Silverman." The subject matter covered must
have some connection with the taxpayer's duties, although it
need not deal exclusively with them.7 1 Since this is the only
66. T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, amended by T.D. 6306, 1958-2 C.B. 64;
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2 (a)- (c), 1.162-2 (d), & 1.162-5 (e) (1958).
67. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
68. 1959-2 C.B. 57.
69. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the last sentence of this pas-
sage indicates that a convention may serve both personal and business
purposes and an allocation in accordance with section 1.162-2(b) may
therefore have to be made. The reference to the Regulations indicates
that the Service does not consider compliance with the sufficient rela-
tionship standard alone determinative of the deductibility of all ex-
penses.
70. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
71. Revenue Ruling 59-316 was updated and clarified in Rev. RuL
63-266, 1963-2 C.B. 88 (emphasis added), which stated:
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test specifically discussed, the Service clearly considers it highly
important, although not exclusive. The referral theory devel-
oped in the early case law might be another way to measure
the requisite business relationship,72 but the absence of any dis-
cussion of the theory in this Ruling implicitly questioned the
legitimacy of that rationale.
The Service continued to assert its position before the
courts" and to the public. A Service news release emphasized
the agenda test, warning taxpayers to carefully consider educa-
tional seminars from a tax standpoint, notwithstanding assur-
ances of deductibility by promoters: "Prospectuses and programs
of some of these proposed 'seminars' raise substantial questions
as to whether the activities described meet the qualifications for
deductible business expenses set forth in the income tax laws
and regulations."7 4 Despite the Service's strong preference for
the agenda test, taxpayers continued to cite the possibility of re-
It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service that the test
for allowance of deductions for convention expenses provided in
section 1.162-2(d) of the regulations is met if the agenda of the
convention or other meeting is so related to the taxpayer's posi-
tion as to show that attendance was for business purposes.
The clarification was intended to eliminate any implication that the
agenda must deal specifically with the taxpayer's business. This conces-
sion is a tacit recognition that material presented at a convention, pos-
sibly in contrast to educational seminars, may not always deal specif-
ically with a participant's employment.
72. See Everett S. Lain, 3 B.T.A. 1157 (1926). See text accompany-
ing note 43 supra. Contra, Wade H. Ellis, 15 B.T.A. 1075 (1929), aff'd sub
noa. Ellis v. Burnet, 50 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (The appeals court
found enhancement of reputation "too remote" to justify a deduction. Id.
at 344.)
73.: See Musser v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9603 (N.D.
Cal. 1957) (upholding the deduction of a professional seminar expense);
Richard Seibold, 31 T.C. 1017 (1959); Ralph Duncan, 30 T.C. 386 (1958).
In Seibold the taxpayer attended a professional convention followed by
a "professional" cruise with his colleagues; the Tax Court employed the
Cohan rule, see note 159 infra and accompanying text, disallowing some
expenses since there was no showing of the time allotment between busi-
ness and personal activities, or proof of attendance at seminars. See also
DeWitt K. Burnham, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 240 (1958).
74. I.R.S. News Release No. IR 357, January 30, 1961, [1961] 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) f 6295, the full text of which provided:
U.S. Internal Revenue Service today warned taxpayers to
consider carefully implications of tax deductibility contained in
certain advertising for tours described as professional seminars.
IRS said such claims had come to its attention in connection
with promotion of trips to luxury resort areas and to places out-
side the United States. It added:
"Prospectuses and programs of some of these proposed 'sem-
inars' raise substantial questions as to whether the activities de-
scribed meet the qualifications for deductible business expenses
set forth in the income tax laws and regulations. This is par-
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ferrals, increased business, and enhancement of reputation as a
basis for finding that the activity was related to their business.
Shortly after publication of the Service's news release, the Tax
Court was faced with this argument in Alexander P. Reed.75
In Reed, a Pittsburgh attorney with a general local prac-
tice had joined an organization "devoted to the advancement
of international law and peaceful settlement of disputes." As
a delegate for the American branch, he went to Yugoslavia for
the annual convention that dealt with matters of international
ticularly true with respect to expenses of spouses of the partici-
pants.
"To be tax deductible, expenditures must be ordinary and
necessary to the taxpayer's business. A number of Internal Rev-
enue rulings and court decisions have served to define rather
closely the acceptable criteria for such deductions."
IRS previously announced it had instructed its examiners to
place increased emphasis on the examination of returns involv-
ing entertainment, travel, and expenses of a similar nature, in-
cluding the cost of purported business trips which are, in fact,
vacations.
In examining a return, the Internal Revenue Agent will, of
course, consider the particular circumstances of a claimed de-
ductible expense, IRS said.
The reference to "luxury resort areas" caused concern among profes-
sional groups and the entrepreneurs who provided facilities for such
meetings. The Service in a subsequent news release indicated that the
location alone would not be determinative. I.R.S. News Release No. IR
394, August 3, 1961, [1961] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6487 which
provided:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mortimer M. Caplin re-
cently has received information that businessmen, trade associa-
tions and other groups are concerned as to whether under ex-
isting law legitimate expense deductions, particularly those for
conventions or business meetings, are being disallowed because
the business activity takes place at a resort area.
There is no reason for such concern, the Commissioner said
in reiterating Service policy in this area. He added:
"While it is true that we have intensified our audit activity
in the travel and entertainment expense area, there has been no
change in the concept of what constitutes a deductible expense.
Those expenses which are clearly shown to be for business pur-
poses will continue to be allowable under existing law."
He said an analysis of a large group of cases from all parts of
the country involving a variety of travel and entertainment ex-
penses did not reveal that any expenses were disallowed merely
because of the site of a convention or meeting. Disallowances
were properly made to eliminate wives' and children's expenses,
expenses of side trips, vacations purported to be business trips,
and for lack of substantiation of expenses incurred.
Commissioner Caplin said: "In order to curb abuses in the
travel and entertainment expense area, our examiners must con-
tinue to take a good hard look at such deductions. At the same
time they must bear in mind that in the absence of a legislative
change, the tests for deductibility of these expenses remain the
same."
75, 35 T.C. 199 (1960).
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law and was attended by lawyers from countries throughout the
world. Petitioner alleged that he joined the International Law
Association in order "to make contacts, enhance his reputation,
and attract clients," but since he failed to factually substantiate
this position, the court did not discuss the merits of this argu-
ment, noting that
such an altruistic motive, commendable as it may be, does not
suffice to meet the statutory prerequisites of section 162 since it
is totally unrelated to petitioner's business. See sec. 1.162-2 (d),
-Income Tax Regs. We are, moreover, unable to discern any
direct and proximate relationship between the purpose of the
Dubrovnik conference as reflected by its agenda and petitioner's
domestic and local law practice in Pittsburgh. Petitioner testi-
fied that he did not derive any fees in the taxable year in issue
from cases involving international law and he stipulated that he
"realized no income directly or through referrals in 1956 or sub-
sequent years as a result of the Dubrovnik conference." In
short, petitioner has failed to show any actual or potential busi-
ness benefit, economic or otherwise, which resulted or might
proximately result from his attendance at the Dubrovnik con-
ference.7 6
The court thus utilized the agenda test to determine whether
a sufficient relationship with the taxpayer's business existed, but
it seemed to recognize the referral argument as a possible alter-
native justification for deductibility.
In addition to promoting the agenda test as the proper mea-
sure of the relationship between the activity and the taxpayer's
business, the Service sought to refine the standards for deter-
mining the taxpayer's primary motivation for engaging in the
activity. Since business, but not personal expenditures are de-
ductible under the Code, the taxpayer's motivation is the control-
ling factor in determining deductibility.7" Although the Regula-
tions arguably do not preclude the use of a subjective "but for"
test for assessing motivation-the taxpayer would not have en-
gaged in the activity but for its connection with his business7 8 -
the Service has generally relied on the more objective "primarily
related" test.
In Reuben v. Hoover7 9 the Service asserted that to show a
business motive the taxpayer had to choose a reasonable means
of achieving his educational objective. The taxpayer, an "ex-
76. Id. at 203 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
77. See text accompanying notes 163-79 infra.
78. See Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18
STAx. L. Ray. 1099, 1112 (1966); note 165 infra.
79. 35 T.C. 566 (1961). The setting of Hoover probably gave rise
to I.R.S. News Release No. IR 394, supra note 74.
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tremely busy" physician, had enrolled in the "Second Postgradu-
ate Medical Seminar Cruise." Five medical professors of Duke
University presented the seminar but it was not officially affili-
ated with the university. The brochure describing the event
mentioned the academic program, but also emphasized the oppor-
tunity for recreation and travel. Only practicing physicians and
their spouses or relatives attended the seminar. The first class
cruise throughout the Mediterranean lasted 18 days, during
which several one-hour medical lectures were presented, followed
by panel discussions. The ship was not specially equipped for
the seminar; no study was required by participants; and non-
academic time was unscheduled. The court found that the lec-
tures were important to the taxpayer's work and that he received
credit for the course.80 Nevertheless, it refused to grant a full
deduction.
Although the court noted that the taxpayer had engaged in
sightseeing and recreational activities, the fact most damaging
to the taxpayer's position was the availability of more reasonably
priced alternative courses. These courses were four days long
and cost an average of $40 per day compared to the $1,881.86 that
the taxpayer spent on the cruise. The court agreed with the
Service's contention that the recreational activities and personal
considerations were the primary reasons the taxpayer decided
to participate in the seminar. The court found "it impossible
to believe that an extremely busy doctor would spend approxi-
mately a month in obtaining information which could have been
obtained from the same faculty in four days and at a fraction
of the cost of the cruise."'81 The court thus considered efficiency
determinative, concluding that since the taxpayer could have ac-
quired the educational benefits more efficiently, his selection of
the cruise evidenced a primarily personal intent. Moreover, the
informal atmosphere and lack of required study also indicated
that his motivation was predominantly nonbusiness. Because
some business relationship existed, however, the Tax Court per-
80. The subject matter lectured upon and discussed was of some
value to petitioner in his practice. Some of the information was
directly assimilated into his work. Petitioner received a certifi-
cate indicating that he had qualified to receive 25 hours post-
graduate education credit. This credit in part satisfied the
requirements of the Academy of General Practice, of which peti-
tioner was a member.
35 T.C. at 568.
81. Id. at 569.
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mitted a deduction of the allocable business portion of the ex-
penses.8 2
Particular attention should be directed to the court's deter-
mination that the recreational nature of the trip and the taxpay-
er's prevailing motivation voided the deduction, notwithstanding
the seminar's educational value and its relationship to the tax-
payer's business. The court made no computation of time
spent at lectures, panel discussions, or in educational conver-
sations among participants (which may have been substantial in
view of the extensive travel time). Although such an analysis
might have revealed that a relatively small portion of time was
devoted to business, and thereby yielded the same result, the
tenor of the opinion is that inefficiency and unreasonableness
were alone sufficient to deny deductibility.
The standards for determining taxpayer motivation were
further developed in Thomas v. Patterson8 3 and Rudolph v.
United States.84 In Patterson, residents of Alabama claimed a
refund after the Service had found that their attending an insur-
ance convention held in Virginia, paid for by their employer, con-
stituted gross income and was not offset by a business deduction.
The annual conventions were attended by those insurance repre-
sentatives who "attained certain standards, evidenced high abili-
ties, and made outstanding contributions to the Company in their
chosen field."8 5 Although the employer did not require eligible
employees to attend, nonattendance would adversely affect fu-
ture advancement in the company. The district court found that
the purpose of the convention was to promote "the professional
knowledge, skill, attitude and morale of agents,"8 6 and concluded
that the primary activity was business even though recreational
and sightseeing activities were also available. Advancing no rea-
soning whatsoever for its conclusion and citing no legal authori-
ties on the issue, the court bluntly concluded that either the reim-
bursements constituted gross income to the taxpayers which were
offset by a corresponding deduction under section 162, or that
the reimbursements were not gross income.87
82. This practice is permitted under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(b) (1),
1.162-5(e) (1) (1958).
83. 189 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ala. 1959), rev'd, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).
84. 189 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), cert. dismissed, 370 U.S. 269 (1962).
85. 189 F. Supp. at 231.
86. Id.
8 . Id. at 232.
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Reversing on appeal, 8  the Fifth Circuit substantially supple-
mented the district court's factual recitation, emphasizing the
convention schedule, the taxpayer's lack of control over the
program, and the time and place of the meeting.89 The court
held that "in kind" payments constitute income and noted that
the taxpayer had not met the requirements for exclusion of in-
come under section 119. 90 Having concluded that the privilege
of participation was an "in kind" receipt of income, the court
considered whether the Regulations' "primary purpose" test had
been met so as to afford a deduction for the constructive expendi-
ture of such amounts. The court emphasized that the employee,
rather than the employer, must meet the test,91 taking the follow-
ing factors into consideration: (1) the relative amount of time
spent in business as opposed to personal activities; (2) the fact
that the participants were co-employees; (3) the location of the
convention; and (4) the attitude of the sponsor and participants.92
The court's initial consideration of the relative time alloca-
tion between business and pleasure indicates the importance of
this factor. The court found that only "five hours out of the
three and one-half days were spent in formal business meet-
88. 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1961).
89. The court presented the agenda which read as follows:
Wednesday, May 16:
1:30 Arrival
1:30-5:00 "Renewing old acquaintances and making new
acquaintances."
6:30 Company dinner and water show.
Thursday, May 17:
7:00-9:30 Breakfast with delegates.
10:00 Meeting (2% hours)
Afternoon-No planned activity (Taxpayer played golf)
8:30 Movie
Friday, May 18:
7:00-8:30 Breakfast with delegates
9:00 Tour of Williamsburg and Jamestown
8:30 Bingo
Saturday, May 19:
7:00-9:30 Breakfast with delegates
10:00 Meeting (2 hours)
Afternoon Boat Trip
7:00 President's Banquet and Ball.
Id. at 111.
90. Id. at 112.
91. The court noted that an employer who provides an employee
with an all expenses paid vacation has a primary business purpose, that
is, increasing the employee's morale, rewarding past performance, and
so forth; however, the employee's primary purpose in taking the trip is
personal and thereby nondeductible. Id. at 112-13.
92. Id. For a discussion of these factors and their impact on em-
ployer conventions, see Keller, Closer I.R.S. Scrutiny of Convention Ex-




ings."93 Recreational time far exceeded business time, even com-
puting the latter by including the welcoming address. The court
acknowledged the "forceful argument" that informal business-
related activity, such as educational and contact conversations,
occurred during recreational periods, and intimated that such
conversations might constitute business time.94 The three other
factors considered, however, precluded finding a business purpose
even with a liberal view of the time allocation.
The second factor the court discussed was that the partici-
pants were employed by the convention's sponsor, which idi-
cated that the convention was really a form of remuneration.
As the court's citation of the Silverman decision suggests,95 how-
ever, this fact should have been treated as immaterial since it
emphasizes the employer's intent rather than the employee's pur-
pose in attending. The third factor was the convention's location
in a resort area. The court acknowledged that this adverse factor
might have been negated by a showing that no other facilities
for the group were available, but found the taxpayer's evidence
on the point inconclusive. Finally, the court considered the com-
pany's attitude,96 which also should have been treated as irrele-
vant except with regard to the gross income issue, and imputed
the company's purpose for holding the convention to the partici-
pants. Various correspondence, including the descriptive bro-
chure sent to participants, emphasized the recreational and sight-
seeing activities available and indicated a substantial nonbusiness
93. 289 F.2d at 113.
94. Id. The court noted:
In answer to this point, the taxpayer forcefully argues that, al-
though the schedule reveals much activity of a purely recrea-
tional nature, he sought as co-participants in those activities
company officials and better salesmen than himself, who might,
while "playing," provide him with information on improving his
abilities. He testified that much of the conversation on the
sight-seeing tour, the boat trip, and his golf game directly con-
cerned his business. Were these the only facts on which the
court had to base its judgment, the proper resolution of the is-
sues in this case would be more difficult than we believe they
are.
Id.
95. The taxpayer had cited the Silverman decision as authority for
his position. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. The Fifth
Circuit distinguished Silverman by noting that it did not involve com-
pany sponsored conventions. 289 F.2d at 113. This approach creates a
bias in favor of self-employed individuals that the Regulations expressly
proscribe. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (d) (1958). Moreover, the remuner-
ative aspect, while relevant to the initial gross income issue, does not
show anything about the employee's purpose. The court erroneously
emphasized the employer's, rather than the employee's, intent.
96. 289 F.2d at 113.
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purpose.9 7 The court concluded that the four factors, considered
together, indicated a primarily personal purpose.9 8 It reversed
the district court's holding as clearly erroneous and denied a de-
duction for the travel expenditures.9 9 A pro rata share of costs
for meals and lodging, reflecting the actual business portion of
the trip, was the only deduction permitted.
Rudolph v. United States'0 0 involved similar facts-a con-
vention of southern insurance salesmen held in New York. The
taxpayer's employer provided an all expenses paid convention
trip to New York City to salesmen who sold a requisite amount
of insurance. The convention lasted five or six days during
which "one morning session was devoted to a business meeting,
followed by a business luncheon," and the remaining portion
was for "travel, sightseeing, entertainment, fellowship or free
time."'10  The participants traveled to and from the convention
on the same train and thus had ample time for discussion.
Rather than looking to the relative time allocation or other
factors, the court focused on the fact that the remote convention
site bore no rational relationship to the group and its activities: 0 2
97. One piece of correspondence specifically stated that "business
was secondary." This, to say the least, was damaging evidence. Other
correspondence to the participants emphasized the "sightseeing activi-
ties."
98. 289 F.2d at 114.
99. Id. The dissent emphasized inter alia that the employee's par-
ticipation was compelled, without considering the potential for abuse in-
herent in such a standard. Would the compulsion be judged on a sub-jective or an objective basis? This standard would permit employers
to give employees "tax free" benefits under the pretext of compulsion.
100. 189 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), cert. dismissed, 370 U.S. 269 (1962).
101. 189 F. Supp. at 3.
102. The court stated:
The recent Alabama case, Thomas v. Patterson, D.C.N.D.
Ala., 189 F. Supp. 230, was for attending a convention at Fort
Monroe in Virginia. It does not appear where the office of the
company is-the insurance company-it does not appear where
the territory of the company is. So far as the information is con-
cerned, much of its business might be around and about Fort
Monroe. Therefore, selection of that place would be in line with
ordinary business economy. In any event, we are concerned with
whether plaintiffs in this case must include the value of the trip
in their income and if so, whether or not they are entitled to
a business expense deduction. We are not concerned with the
deductibility of the convention's cost by the insurance company.
It is the purpose of the convention to the taxpayers which gov-
erns our action, not the purpose of the insurance company in
holding them.
We will assume that the company here has a larger part of
its business in Texas and adjoining states. Primarily, the place of
the home office would be the place where the agents would be
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The court's conclusion is that the holding of these conventions
generally, and especially the holding of them at remote places,
have the primary purpose of affording a pleasure trip which the
agent himself, to enjoy, would have paid out of his own funds if
the Company had not given it to him, which is in every way in
the nature of a reward that would be a bonus.103
The unreasonableness of selecting a locale that was geographi-
cally remote from the participants' residences, the sponsor's home
office, and the sponsor's and participants' business surroundings
was convincing evidence of a nonbusiness purpose. Although the
insignificant amount of time spent on business also evidenced
a personal purpose, the decision indicates that deductibility may
be limited by an "ordinary and necessary" standard relating sim-
ply to the reasonableness of the convention site. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed per curiam noting that the case was no different
from Patterson.1
0 4
Although minor litigation on these issues continued,10 5 the
only other significant development during this period came from
Congress. Prior to 1962, travel expenses were deductible on
an "all or nothing" basis under section 162. In that year,
however, Congress enacted section 274 as part of the Revenue
called to as a business proposition to receive instructions and
to be taught.
Suppose there was a lot of business down and around San
Antonio. To break the monotony to a degree, the convention
might be held in San Antonio, or in Houston, or might be held in
Oklahoma City. ' But what business reason is there for holding a
convention in a place as far away as New York; and certainly,
what business reason is there for holding a convention in Havana,
Cuba. It was not held down there for educational purposes in
insurance.
Assume that it was to a degree; what was the primary pur-
pose of the trip: It was a reward, or a bonus given to the em-
ployees for excellence in service. If it was purely educational, it
might be held here in Dallas and those who did not attain such a
high rating might have the benefit of the program at the conven-
tion.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Rudolph v. United States, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961). The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), but subsequently
dismissed it as improvidently granted on the ground that resolution of
the primary purpose test was factual and subject to the clearly erroneous
rule. 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (per curiam). Justice Harlan would have up-
held the decision. Id. at 270-78. Harlan discussed the Regulations
on deductibility, including the primarily related test. He did not employ
an independent factor analysis, however, for he concluded that the lower
court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
105. Most cases were resolved without significant discussion of the
rationale for deductibility, or an analysis of the criteria the taxpayer had
to satisfy. In Hier v. United States, 13 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d 1043 (S.D.
Calif. 1964), teachers acquired credit for educational activity on a cruise.
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Act of 1962106 in an effort to limit the total deductibility of com-
bined business-pleasure trips. This section applied to both do-
mestic and foreign travel and required an allocation of expenses
between deductible business activity and nondeductible personal
activity.10 7 The provision's legislative history indicates that it
was intended to eliminate a subjective "but for" determination
of deductibility for travel expenses. 108 This suggests that,
in spite of the 1958 Regulation's objective criteria, a tax-
payer's subjective intent was frequently controlling in evaluating
deductibility. In 1964, the concern of the domestic resort and
entertainment industry led to the repeal of section 274 insofar
The court, noting the availability of similar courses near the taxpayers'
residences, denied the deduction without analyzing the relative time allo-
cation or other factors. In Robert H. Cowing, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686
(1969), convention travel expenditures related to business were disal-
lowed since travel time and frequent stops in a personal plane en route
were disproportionate with the "remote" benefits derived from attend-
ance. Rev. Rul. 64-176, 1964-1 C.B. 87, required sabbatical travel to have
a substantive educational relationship to the taxpayer's business in order
to achieve deductibility for expenses incurred. Marjory C. Greenfield,
24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1071 (1964), held Christian Scientist convention ex-
penditures nondeductible since they had no relationship to the taxpayer's
trade or business. In Richard Seibold, 31 T.C. 1017 (1959), the court
disallowed expenses incurred by a teacher who traveled to Europe and
received educational credits for the travel, notwithstanding the substan-
tive relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business. The court empha-
sized that
[w]e do not think the mere granting of educational credits to the
traveler renders the expense an ordinary and necessary business
expense even though those credits are applicable toward the
credit requirements of the inservice program. Merely because
necessary credits are obtained in some permissible way does not
mean the expense incurred by the teacher in securing them is
deductible.
Id. at 1021. Rev. Rul. 60-16, 1960-1 C.B. 58, concluded that employees
and self-employed persons should be treated equally regarding conven-
tion expenditures. Irving Eisenberg, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 174 (1967), de-
nied deductions for expenses incurred for convention attendance in Is-
rael. No business relationship and no referrals or derived income were
shown. In Kloppenburg v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9200 (S.D.
Ill. 1965), the jury instructions used the agenda test and business ben-
efits test as a basis for determining deductibility. Ralph S. Cannon, 24
T.C.M. (CCH) 1074 (1965), held a foreign geological conference and ad-
ditional travel deductible. In Duncan v. Bookwalter, 216 F. Supp. 301
(W.D. Mo. 1963), and Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 188 (D.C. Md. 1967), the Service attempted an alternative method
to combat convention abuse by suing the employer who had furnished
the trip for failure to withhold tax on income consisting of the payment
of convention expenses.
106. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
107. Id. § 4, 76 Stat. 974.
108. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in [1962] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3304, 3337.
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as it applied to domestic travel. 0 9 This action raised questions
concerning the use of the subjective "but for" standard that are
still unanswered. 110
Thus, although general deductibility standards had been
clarified during this period-the "sufficient relationship"
standard as interpreted by Reed, the "primarily related" test as
applied in Patterson and Rudolph, and the overriding efficien-
cy/reasonableness requirement as evidenced in Hoover-impor-
tant issues remained unresolved.
C. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS, 1969-Present
The most recent period in the development of the tax laws
relating to conventions and seminars has been characterized
by the Service's in terrorem public pronouncements and by
new congressional efforts to curb the abuse inherent in the travel
and convention area.
In mid-1972, the Service announced that it was carefully
scrutinizing convention and seminar activities. It noted that
"a number of professional, business, or trade organizations and
associations have been sponsoring trips and conventions during
which only a small portion of the time is devoted to business."'111
Consequently, greater review would be given those situations.
Awakened by these pronouncements and prodded by the contin-
ued use of such activities to disguise vacations, members of Con-
gress began an effort to limit the abuse.
Congressman James Corman of California, introducing the
Tax Equity Act of 1973, which would have disallowed all ex-
penses of attending conventions outside the United States,112
stated:
This section disallows expenses of travel (including meals and
lodging) of an individual in connection with attending a con-
vention held outside the United States. As a general rule, such
109. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 217, 78 Stat. 56.
110. See text accompanying notes 171-74 infra.
111. I.R.S. News Release No. IR 1224, [1972] STAND. FED_ TAX REP.
(C.C.H.) f 6729 (June 1, 1972). This release further provided: "Pro-
motional material sent out by the sponsoring organization often empha-
sizes vacation possibilities and implies that the cost of the trip or conven-
tion is tax deductible .... As a result some taxpayers may have been
mislead into deducting the cost of the trip or convention." Id.
112. H.R. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306 (1973). For a detailed dis-
cussion of this bill, which gave rise to many of the proposals before the
House Ways and Means Committee in 1975, see Emory, The Corman and
Mills-Mansfield Bills: A Look at Some Major Tax Reform Issues, 29
TAx L. REV. 3 (1973).
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expenses are incurred primarily for pleasure rather than busi-
ness. Thus, expenses of lawyers attending the American Bar
Convention in London in 1971 would have been disallowed if the
amendment had been in effect.113
Although the amendment would have had only prospective ef-
fect, it is not clear whether it was intended merely to codify cur-
rent law. Corman's reference to the primary purpose test indi-
cates that he felt the proposal was founded on the current Regu-
lations and that under them an unreasonable location should pre-
clude deductibility. The bill was referred to the Ways and Means
Committee where no action was taken." 4
The only major judicial decision regarding the deductibility
of convention-educational seminar expenses was Esfandiar Kad-
ivar,"5 also handed down in 1973. The taxpayer had a foreign
medical degree and began an internship program to qualify for
American practice. He participated in a 14-day "Orient Adven-
ture" trip sponsored by the Southern Medical Association that
was intended to combine travel to foreign capitals with one hour
medical seminars held in tourist hotels. At the conclusion of
the trip, he received a "Certificate for Continuing Education in
Medicine." The Tax Court, citing the Regulations and noting the
section 274(c) allocation procedure," 6 concluded perfunctorily
that the trip was "primarily for pleasure." Relying on Patterson,
the court denied the entire deduction. "The few hours spent at
brief medical seminars [did] not convert what was in all other
respects a vacation into a business trip.""17 Thus, the court con-
tinued to emphasize the formal educational aspects of the trip
and relative time allocation.
The Service followed Kadivar in Revenue Ruling 74-292.118
A physician participated in a 14-day medical association spon-
sored trip to two foreign countries. A travel agency arranged
the trip and provided three two-hour professional seminars in
each country. The taxpayer attended all meetings and received
a "Certificate of Continuing Education in Medicine." The Rul-
ing stipulated that no cost was attributable to the seminars.
After reviewing the Regulations and discussing Kadivar, it con-
113. 119 CONG. REC. H 47 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1973) (emphasis added).
114. 119 CONG. REC. H 86 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1973).
115. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1973). Expenses of attending chiro-
practic business seminars were allowed in R.O. Watts, [1975] TAX CT.
MEM. DEC. (P-H) 75,131, without substantive discussion.
116. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 429.
117. Id.
118. 1974-1 C.B. 43.
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cluded that the activity was primarily personal and nondeduct-
ible.
In the instant case the facts show that (1) the six two-hour pro-
fessional seminars did not convert what was in all respects a
vacation into a business trip; (2) the expenses incurred for
travel were not related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness; and (3) no other expenses were incurred that were directly
attributable to the conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business.
The participation in some incidental activity by the taxpayer
related to his trade or business will not change what otherwise
was a vacation trip into a business trip.119
Interestingly, the Ruling completely ignores the Code's specific
foreign travel provision and its allocation provisions. 120 The Ser-
vice's analysis assumes the provision is applicable only if the "pri-
marily related" test is met, but this issue is still unresolved. 121
Congress remained actively concerned with revising the tax
laws in this area and in 1974 the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee tentatively revived the Corman proposal to disallow all
expenses of foreign conventions:
The committee agreed to limit deductions allowable for the
expenses of taxpayers attending conventions, educational sem-
inars or similar meetings outside the United States. The general
rule agreed to by the committee is that no deduction is allowablefor foreign travel expenses (including expenses for transporta-
tion, meals and lodging) for an individual with respect to a con-
vention, seminar or similar meeting held outside the United
States unless the location is consistent with the activities, pur-
poses and functions of such convention, meeting or seminar.
This rule would not apply to a meeting conducted by an
organization which draws from foreign members to the extent
the number and location of its foreign meetings are reasonable
in light of the number of foreign members and their geograph-
ical dispersion. Present law relating to the allocation of ex-
penses would continue to apply in any case where foreign meet-
ings may still be deductible.
This rule also is not intended to apply to the expenses in-
curred in attending a convention, etc., at a location that is
uniquely suited to the purposes of the convention, provided that
the attendance at the conference by an individual is related to
119. Id. at 44.
120. I.R.C. § 274. See regulations cited in note 121 infra.
121. Section 274's reference to section 162 implies that the "primarily
related" prerequisite of section 162 must be met. See note 12 supra.
Various examples under the section 274 Regulations regarding travel,
however, indicate merely that if some business activity occurs the ex-
penses will be prorated accordingly. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(g) exam-
ple (7) (1963). Possibly the taxpayer in the Ruling could not, in view
of the minimal business time, fulfill the day allocation requirements.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (1963). See also Ahmed F. Habeeb,
[1976] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1134 (August 19, 1976) (professor's
lecture trip to Egypt entitled him to deduct transportation expenses but
other expenses were to be recomputed or disallowed under section 274).
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his trade or business. Thus, a deduction will not be allowed in
the case of an individual who attends a meeting conducted or
sponsored by a domestic organization in all respects (member-
ship and organizational purpose) which meets outside the United
States unless there is a compelling reason for meeting outside
the United States.122
Apparently the proposal would have denied deductions for
foreign conventions whenever the site selected was unreason-
able; 123 notably, domestic conventions were not included in the
proscription. Thus, domestic organizations could not convene at
a foreign location unless they could show a compelling reason
to do so; for example, on-the-spot observation at a foreign locale
might be critical to an archeologists' seminar.12 4  Had the pro-
posal been enacted,12 5 the exceptions would probably have been
narrowly construed, since the aim was clearly to forestall at-
tempts to bootstrap the deductibility of expenses by creating or-
ganizations with token foreign representation. Except in cases of
compelling reasons for the selection of a foreign locale, the pro-
posal probably would have required that the foreign members
constitute a significant percentage or majority of the total num-
ber of participants and that the frequency with which foreign
locales were selected reflect the proportion of foreign members.
In late 1975 the Committee retreated from this approach.
Although several members of the Committee expressed support
for the 1974 position,'12 6 the final proposal allowed the deduction
of limited expenses of attending two foreign conventions an-
nually. Expenses of all other foreign conventions were nonde-
ductible. 127
The 1975 House Committee Report reviewed the current state
of the law and discussed some of the standards for deductibility
established by the Regulations and case law, but did not discuss
122. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
93RD CONG., 2D SESS., BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TENTATIVE DECISIONS FOR
DRAFTING PURPOSES ON TAX REFoRm PROPOSALS, 7 (Comm. Print Aug. 22,
1974) (emphasis added).
123. The proposal closely approximates the Canadian treatment of
conventions discussed at note 230 infra.
124. See Duncan v. Bookwalter, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9415 (W.D.
Mo. 1963) (deductions allowed for travel expenses incurred in study of
alcoholism in locations unique to the subject matter).
125. This provision of the House Ways and Means bill was deleted
and not reported to the floor of the House. See H. REP. No. 93-1502,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
126. See First Phase of Tax Reform, WaVs and Means Committee
Member Selections of Proposals for Consideration, III C, [1975] 9 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) f 6161.




the geographical reasonableness standard enunciated in Ru-
dolph.1 28 The proposed legislation was designed to curb the con-
tinued use of conventions as "disguised vacations," during which
the participants spend little time on business-related material.
The Report also emphasized that the lack of specific guidelines
for conventions was an impediment to efficient administration
and that the subsidization of such "exotic" activity through loss
of federal tax revenues had an adverse effect on taxpayer
morale.129
The House passed the proposed legislation in 1975.130 The
Senate Finance Committee considered the bill and reported to
the Senate floor revised legislation that mirrored the 1974 House
proposal requiring a "reasonable" locale.' 3 ' The conference com-
128. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 167-71 (1975).
129. , The Committee noted:
Your committee is concerned that the lack of specific detailed
requirements has resulted in a proliferation of foreign conven-
tions, seminars, cruises, etc. which, in effect, amount to Govern-
ment-subsidized vacations and serve little, if any, business pur-
pose. Your committee is aware that the promotional material
often highlights the deductibility of the expenses incurred in at-
tending a foreign convention or seminar and, in some cases, de-
scribes the meeting in such terms as a "tax-paid vacation" in
a "glorious" location. In addition, your committee has been
made aware that there are organizations that advertise that they
will find a convention for the taxpayer to attend in any part
of the world at any given time of the year. This type of promo-
tion has an adverse impact on public confidence in the fairness
of the tax laws.
Id. at 169.
130. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 602 (1975), was passed by the
House for the first time on December 4, 1975. 121 CONG. REc. H. 11859
(daily ed. Dec. 4, 1975).
131. This version of the Act read as follows:
Sec. 602, DEDUCTIONS FOR ATTENDING FOREIGN
CONVENTIONS.
(a) NONDEDUCTIBILITY OF CERTAIN EXPENSES.-
Section 274 (relating to disallowance of certain entertainment,
etc., expenses) is amended by redesignating subsection (h) as
subsection (i) and by inserting after subsection (g) the follow-
ing new subsection:
"(h) ATTENDANCE AT CONVENTIONS, ETC.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any individual who at-
tends a convention, seminar, or other meeting which is held out-
side the North American area, no deduction shall be allowed
under section 162 or 212 for expenses allocable to such meeting
unless the taxpayer establishes that the meeting is directly re-
lated to the active conduct of his trade or business or to an ac-
tivity described in section 212 and that, after taking into account
in the manner provided by regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary-
"(A) the purpose of such meeting and the activities
taking place at such meeting,
"(B) the purposes and activities of the sponsoring or-
ganizations or groups, and
"(C) the residences of the active members of the spon-
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mittee, however, adopted the 1975 House version, 132 which was
ultimately enacted. 133 This new law permits a taxpayer to de-
soring organization and the places at which other meetings
of the sponsoring organization or groups have been held or
will be held,
it is more reasonable for the meeting to be held outside the
North American area than within the North American area.
"(2) CONVENTIONS ON CRUISE SHIPS.-In the case of
any individual who attends a convention, seminar, or other
meeting which is held on any cruise ship, no deduction shall be
allowed under section 162 or 212 for expenses allocable to such
meeting.
"(3) DEFINITIONS.-
"(A) NORTH AMERICAN AREA DEFINED.-For pur-
poses of paragraph (1), the term 'North American area'
means the United States, its possessions, and the area lying
west of the thirtieth meridian west of Greenwich, east of the
international dateline, and north of the Equator, but not in-
cluding any country on the continent of South America.
"(B) CRUISE SHIP.-For purposes of paragraph (2),
the term 'cruise ship' means any vessel sailing within or
without the territorial waters of the United States.
"(4) SUBSECTION TO APPLY TO EMPLOYER AS
WELL AS TO TRAVELER.-This subsection shall apply to de-
ductions otherwise allowable under section 162 or 212 to any
person, whether or not such person is the individual attending
the foreign convention."
(b) EFFECTIVE DATES.
(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to trips be-
ginning after June 30, 1976.
(2) EXCEPTION.-The amendments made by subsection
(a) shall not apply to any trip which begins before January 1,
1978, if the sponsoring organization establishes (in advance of
the beginning of such trip) to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of the Treasury or his delegate-
(A) that it was publicly announced before January 1,
1976, that this convention, seminar, or other meeting was to
be held, and
(B) that the accommodations necessary for the holding
of the convention, seminar, or other meeting were booked
before January 1, 1976.
H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 602 (1976).
132. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515, JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 437, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1222, 1250.
133. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 602, 90 Stat.
1520 (codified at I.R.C. § 274 (h)), provides:
(h) FOREIGN CONVENTIONS.(1) DEDUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NOT MORE
THAN 2 FOREIGN CONVENTIONS PER YEAR ALLOWED.-
If any individual attends more than 2 foreign conventions during
his taxable year-
(A) he shall select not more than 2 of such conventions
to be taken into account for purposes of this subsection, and
(B) no deduction allocable to his attendance at any
foreign convention during such taxable year (other than a
foreign convention selected under subparagraph (A)) shall
be allowed under section 162 or 212.(2) DEDUCTIBLE TRANSPORTATION COST CANNOT
EXCEED COST OF COACH OR ECONOMY AIR FARE.-In the
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duct the expenses of any two of the foreign conventions he has
attended during the taxable year. The deductible expenses, how-
ever, are strictly defined. They are divided into two categories,
transportation and subsistence, with separate requirements for
deductions under each category.
case of any foreign convention, no deduction for the expenses
of transportation outside the United States to and from the site
of such convention shall be allowed under section 162 or 212 in
an amount which exceeds the lowest coach or economy rate at
the time of travel charged by any commercial airline for trans-
portation to and from such site during the calendar month in
which such convention begins. If there is no such coach or econ-
omy rate, the preceding sentence shall be applied by substitut-
ing 'first class' for 'coach or economy.'
(3) TRANSPORTATION COSTS DEDUCTIBLE IN FULL
ONLY IF AT LEAST ONE-HALF OF THE DAYS ARE DE-
VOTED TO BUSINESS RELATED ACTIVITIES.-In the case of
any foreign convention, a deduction for the full expenses of
transportation (determined after the application of paragraph(2)) to and from the site of such convention shall be allowed
only if more than one-half of the total days of the trip, excluding
the days of transportation to and from the site of such conven-
tion, are devoted to business related activities. If less than one-
half of the total days of the trip, excluding the days of transpor-
tation to and from the site of the convention, are devoted to busi-
ness related activities, no deduction for the expenses of transpor-
tation shall be allowed which exceeds the percentage of the days
of the trip devoted to business related activities.
(4) DEDUCTIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE EXPENSES NOT
ALLOWED UNLESS THE INDIVIDUAL ATTENDS TWO-
THIRDS OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.-In the case of any for-
eign convention, no deduction for subsistence expenses shall be
allowed except as follows:
(A) a deduction for a full day of subsistence expenses
while at the convention shall be allowed if there are at least
6 hours of scheduled business activities during such day and
the individual attending the convention has attended at least
two-thirds of these activities, and
(B) a deduction for one half day of subsistence ex-
penses while at the convention shall be allowed if there are
at least 3 hours of scheduled business activities during such
day and the individual attending the convention has at-
tended at least two-thirds of these activities.
Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), a deduction for
subsistence expenses for all of the days or half days, as the case
may be, of the convention shall be allowed if the individual at-
tending the convention has attended at least two-thirds of the
scheduled business activities and each such full day consists of
at least 6 hours of scheduled business activities and each such
half day consists of at least 3 hours of scheduled business ac-
tivities.
(5) DEDUCTIBLE SUBSISTENCE COSTS CANNOT EX-
CEED PER DIEM RATE FOR UNITED STATES CIVIL SERV-
ANTS.-In the case of any foreign convention, no deduction for
subsistence expenses while at the convention or traveling to or
from such convention shall be allowed at a rate in excess of the
dollar per diem rate for the site of the convention which has
been established under section 5702(a) of title 5 of the United
States Code and which is in effect for the calendar month in
which the convention begins.
CONVENTION EXPENSES
Transportation expenses cannot exceed the cost of "coach or
economy air fare." Thus, a participant traveling first class may
deduct only an amount equal to the lowest coach or economy
fare available during that month on a commercial airline. The
use of other transportation would apparently be permissible, sub-
(6) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.-For purposes
of this subsection-
(A) FOREIGN CONVENTION DEFINED.-The term
'foreign convention' means any convention, seminar or simi-
lar meeting held outside the United States, its possessions
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific.(B) SUBSISTENCE EXPENSES DEFINED.-The term
'subsistence expenses' means lodging, meals, and other nec-
essary expenses for the personal sustenance and comfort of
the traveler. Such term includes tips and taxi and other
local transportation expenses.
(C) ALLOCATION OF EXPENSES IN CERTAIN
CASES.-In any case where the transportation expenses or
the subsistence expenses are not separately stated, or where
there is reason to believe that the stated charge for trans-
portation expenses or subsistence expenses or both does not
properly reflect the amounts properly allocable to such pur-
poses, all amounts paid for transportation expenses and sub-
sistence expenses shall be treated as having been paid solely
for subsistence expenses.(D) SUBSECTION TO APPLY TO EMPLOYER AS
WELL AS TO TRAVELER.-This subsection shall apply to
deductions otherwise allowable under section 162 or 212 to
any person, whether or not such person is the individual at-
tending the foreign convention. For purposes of the preced-
ing sentence, such person shall be treated, with respect to
each individual, as having selected the same 2 foreign con-
ventions as were selectedby each individual.(7) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.-No deduction shall
be allowed under section 162 or 212 for transportation or sub-
sistence expenses allocable to attendance at a foreign convention
unless the taxpayer claiming the deduction attaches to the return
of tax on which the deduction is claimed-
(A) a written statement signed by the individual at-
tending the convention which includes-
Ci) information with respect to the total days of the
trip, excluding the days of transportation to and from
the site of each convention, and the number of hours of
each day of the trip which such individual devoted to
scheduled business activities,
(ii) a program of the scheduled business activities of
the convention, and
(iii) such other information as may be required in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary; and
(B) a written statement signed by an officer of the or-
ganization or group sponsoring the convention which in-
cludes-(i) a schedule of the business activities of each day
of the convention,
(ii) the number of hours which the individual attend-
ing the convention attended such scheduled business ac-
tivities, and(iii) such other information as may be required in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
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ject to the airline expense standard, notwithstanding the time
expenditure involved. The transportation costs so determined
are deductible in full if more than one-half of the total days of
the trip (excluding transportation days) are devoted to "business-
related activities." If less than one-half of the total days are
"business related," only that portion of the transportation ex-
penses equal to the percentage of business-related activity, com-
puted on a daily basis, is allowable. The critical term "business
related activities" is not defined by the statute, and the commit-
tee report only obliquely indicates its scope by its discussion of
the similar standard imposed with respect to subsistence ex-
penses.13 4 Apparently the term is intended to encompass sched-
134. The Conference Committee Summary and Report explains the
basic provisions of the legislation but provides no guidance for resolving
the more difficult questions raised by the legislation. It provides:
Sec. 602. Deductions for attending foreign conventions.
The conference agreement provides that deductions will be
allowed for expenses incurred in attending, not more than two
conventions, education seminars, or similar meetings outside the
United States, its possessions and the Trust Territory of the Pa-
cific. The amount of the deduction for transportation expenses
to and from these foreign conventions can not exceed the cost
of airfare based on coach or economy class charges. (However,
this limitation does not apply to that portion of travel that is
within the United States.) Transportation expenses will be de-
ductible in full only if more than one-half of the total days of
the trip (excluding the days of transportation to and from the
site of the convention) are devoted to business-related activities.
If less than one-half of the total days of a trip are devoted to
business-related activities, a deduction will be allowed for trans-
portation expenses only in the ratio of the business time to total
time. Deductions for subsistence expenses, such as meals, lodg-
ing and other ordinary and necessary expenses, paid or incurred
while attending the convention will be limited to the fixed
amount of per diem allowed to government employees at the
location where the convention is held. However, in order to de-
duct subsistence expenses up to this limitation for a day, there
must generally be at least 6 hours of business-related activities
scheduled daily (or 3 hours for a deduction for one-half day)
and the taxpayer must have attended two-thirds of these activ-
ities.
The conference agreement provides that no deduction is to
be allowed unless the taxpayer complies with certain reporting
requirements in addition to present law substantiation require-
ments. Under these reporting requirements, the taxpayer must
furnish information indicating the nprnber of hours of each day
and the total number of days of transportation to and from the
place of convention that the taxpayer devoted to business-re-
lated activities, attach a program or agenda of the convention
activities (and a brochure describing the convention, if avail-
able), and furnish any other information required by regula-
tions. In addition, the taxpayer must attach a statement signed
by an appropriate officer of the sponsoring organization to his
income tax return, indicating the total number of convention
days, the number of hours of business-related activities that the




uled convention activities, testing their deductibility by a sub-
stantive agenda standard computed on an objective time basis,
as discussed further below.1 35 The statute does not address the
problem of convention attendance that is combined with prior
or subsequent business and personal activity. It is unclear
whether the foreign convention provisions will apply to non-con-
vention business activity at the convention site or whether such
activity will be subject to the general foreign travel standards
of section 274. Unfortunately, the committee reports accompany-
ing the Act do not clarify this uncertainty or the others discussed
below.1 16
Subsistence expenses (meals, lodging, and "other necessary
expenses for the personal sustenance and comfort of the trav-
eler") are also subject to two limitations. Each specific day
is evaluated, and expenses are deductible either totally (a whole
day) or in part (a half day) if substantive activities related to
a taxpayer's trade or business, calculated according to the agenda
standard,. 3 7 are scheduled and the participant attends two-thirds
of the scheduled hours. Notwithstanding the above computation,
credit for all full and half days is available if the participant
attends two-thirds of the total scheduled activities, provided sub-
stantial activities are scheduled on all days. 38
A "full day" has more than six hours of activities sched-
uled, 30 while a "half day" involves more than three hours.140
In order to receive credit, a participant must attend at least two-
thirds of the activities scheduled for the day. As noted in the
committee report, attendance for two hours of a scheduled six-
hour day does not result in a half day deduction, since a full
day was scheduled.' 4 1 The report states that convention sched-
ules in excess of the minimum statutory standards for full or
half days will require attendance at two-thirds of the scheduled
activity. Time involved in nonscheduled discussions or scheduled
Under the conference agreement, the provision is to apply
to conventions, seminars and similar meetings which take place
after December 31, 1976.
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HousE oF REPRESENTATIVES, 94TH CONG.,
2D SEss., SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON THE TAX REFORM
AcT oF 1976 (H.R. 10612) 21-22 (Comm. Print 1976).
135. See text accompanying notes 146-56 & 180-97 infra.
136. Other problems with the new legislation are briefly discussed
at text accompanying notes 144-45 infra.
137. I.R.C. § 274(h) (7) (A) (ii). See note 133 supra.
138. Id. § 274(h) (4). See note 133 supra.
139. Id. § 274(h) (4) (A). See note 133 supra.
140. Id. § 274(h) (4) (B). See note 133 supra.
141. HR. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess 170 (1975).
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social activities will not count, apparently notwithstanding the
substantive nature of the conversations or potential referrals.
Banquets at which speeches or lectures are given will count only
if the address is substantively oriented and only time actually
spent in the delivery of the speech will be credited. 14 2 Once
the allowable subsistence expenditures are calculated, the total
full day or half day expenses may not exceed the per diem rate
for that locale established for United States civil servants.1 43
The effectiveness of this limitation in restricting extravagant ac-
tivities will depend on the per diem rate in force.
However well intentioned, the legislation ineffectively limits
the abuse inherent in convention and seminar activities, since
most taxpayers do not attend more than two foreign conventions
annually. The legislation may limit the amount of the deduction,
but it will leave the abusive attendance pattern untouched.
Furthermore, the reasonableness of the convention site is not
considered in the new law and it seems unlikely that it will be
construed to include the reasonableness limitation developed in
previous case law.'4 4 Thus, the federal government will continue
to subsidize vacations in glorious locations. The new legislation
is not without merit, however, since it makes a significant im-
provement in objectifying the standards for the deductibility of
foreign convention expenses. A preferable alternative would be
to adopt the 1974 House and Senate proposal regarding reason-
able locales, 145 expand it to govern both foreign and domestic
conventions, and retain the new objective standards for deter-
mining the amount deductible if the locale is reasonable.
III. ANALYSIS OF UNDEFINED STANDARDS FOR
DEDUCTIBILITY
As indicated by the developments traced above, the federal
government has made continuous efforts to properly define the
circumstances under which convention and educational seminar
expenses should be deductible. Nevertheless, major issues re-
142. Id.
143. I.R.C. § 274(h) (5). See note 133 supra.
144. The 1976 act did not specifically address the reasonableness lim-
itation, which thus may remain unaffected. While this author prefers
this view, the conference committee's ultimate rejection of the Corman
proposal suggests a congressional intent to reject the reasonableness limi-
tation it contained. See text accompanying note 132 supra.'
145. The reasonableness limitation applicable to domestic conven-




garding the application of the criteria already developed remain
unsettled, making a taxpayer's proper reporting of such expenses
uncertain, and impeding effective Service audit procedures. The
problem is compounded by the general public belief that any ex-
penditure may be deducted if it has a relationship to one's trade
or business.
The major unsettled issues are: (1) which is the proper
standard for ascertaining whether the convention or seminar has
a sufficient relationship to the taxpayer's business or improves his
business skills-the referral theory, the educational/agenda ap-
proach, or a combination thereof; (2) how is the taxpayer's pri-
mary purpose determined and what are the controlling standards
-a Patterson factor analysis approach, or a relative time alloca-
tion standard; (3) is the taxpayer's motivation judged by a sub-
jective "but for" test or by objective criteria, and what role is
accorded factors other than time; and (4) if the location of the
meeting is not consistent with the group's composition, does that
result in nondeductibility?
A. THE APPLICATION OF THE "SUFFICIENT RELATIONSHIP" STANDARD
-REFERRAL THEORY v. EDUCATIONAL THEORY
Convention expenditures are deductible under the Regula-
tions if sufficiently related to one's business; 14 6 seminar expenses
are similarly deductible if the activity improves one's business
skills.147 Historically, courts have applied, or at least recognized,
two doctrines by which to measure the relationship of the activ-
ity to the business: the educational relationship test, usually ap-
plied objectively by reviewing the agenda, and the referral ap-
proach, where the taxpayer proves that new contacts or enhanced
reputation may flow from attendance. The Service has empha-
sized the more objective educational standard, administered by
considering the relationship between the taxpayer's business and
the convention program described by the agenda, 4 8 but has im-
plicitly recognized other methods of proof in noting that the
agenda standard is only "one method" which can be employed.149
The existence of the two doctrines is understandable since
early judicial decisions holding that educational expenses consti-
tuted nondeductible capital expenditures'5" made the alternative
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1958).
147. Id. §§ 1.162-5(b) & (e).
148. See Rev. Rul. 59-316, 1959-2 C.B. 57.
149. Id.
150. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill (1933) (dictum by Justice Car-
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justification of potential increased income provided by the refer-
ral theory appealing. Since the recognition of the deductibility
of business education expenses, however, the educational stand-
ard has become predominant, with the referral argument cited
in desperation only when the taxpayer fails to meet the more
objective standard. Use of the educational standard is appropri-
ate since seminars and conventions for all practical purposes con-
stitute the same activity under different labels and it would be
anomalous to treat them differently. Educational expenditures
are clearly deductible, and the Regulations' maintenance and im-
provement of skills standard does not recognize a referral doc-
trine. While the educational standard may not be strictly applied
to conventions where numerous topics are discussed,1 51 the need
to avoid "labeling" abuse would seem to mandate treating each
type of meeting similarly. The specificity of the education regu-
lations makes that standard preferable from the standpoint of
predictability and ease of application. Therefore, the agenda/ed-
ucational approach should be the sole criterion for fulfilling the
sufficient relationship test.
Decisions recognizing a possible referral and reputation argu-
ment may be disregarded either as aberrations forced by the
early judicial view of education expenses, or as mere recognitions,
and not judicial adoptions, of the taxpayer's position. No recent
opinion has upheld a deduction on the referral ground. More-
over, if the referral standard were to suffice for noneducational
convention activity, it should logically suffice for any expendi-
ture which could give rise to referrals. This extension of the
referral argument, however, has been explicitly rejected. In the
analogous area of business entertainment expenses, the Regula-
tions require that the taxpayer have "more than a general expec-
tation of deriving some income or other specific trade or business
benefit (other than the goodwill of the person or persons enter-
tained) at some indefinite future time from the making of the
expenditure.' 15 2 Similarly, the Tax Court recently rejected the
dozo). See also text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
151. See text following note 157 infra.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (3) (i) (1963). One might argue that
since the Regulations establish a more relaxed standard for "associated
entertainment" as opposed to "directly related" entertainment, conven-
tions are specifically excepted. However, associated entertainment must
further illustrate a clear business purpose, such as "to obtain new busi-
ness or to encourage the continuation of an existing business relation-
ship." Id. § 1.274-2 (d) (2). Further, the convention is merely the requi-
site nexus, "a substantial and bona fide business discussion," id. § 1.274-
2 (d) (3) (b), for entertainment expenses, provided the expenses were de-
ductible under section 162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2 (d) (3) (i) (a) & (b)
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argument in an otherwise compelling situation. In Robert W.
Duncan, Jr.,153 a dentist joined a social club in which no other
dentist was a member. The court found that he received a sub-
stantial portion of his business fees from club members who had
become his patients. In denying the deductions for dues and
other club expenses, the court noted that the activity (joining
the club) itself must possess a relationship to the taxpayer's busi-
ness in order to justify the deduction and differentiate it from
a personal expenditure. Under this rationale, attending a con-
vention for referrals alone would not suffice since there must
be a business nexus with the activity. This requirement is prop-
erly maintained in the convention-seminar area by utilizing the
educational standard.
The undesirability of using the referral test is further dem-
onstrated by the evidentiary problems that would arise in at-
tempting to apply it. If the test involved analysis of the taxpay-
er's subjective intent-whether he initially intended to get refer-
rals by attending the convention-courts and administrators
would be forced to evaluate intangible factors such as demeanor
and credibility. Even a more objective "reasonable man" stand-
ard'5 4 would create problems, such as the necessity for taking
judicial notice of referral practices. If, to cure these problems,
the validity of the taxpayer's claim were determined by whether
referrals were actually derived, then the standard could easily
lead to disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. As-
sume hypothetically that two tax attorneys, similar to the tax-
(1963). Thus, the relaxed standard for entertainment expenses regard-
ing convention attendance may be permissible on policy grounds, but the
standard for deductibility under section 162 need not be so lax.
153. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 130 (1972). See Robert Lee Henry, 36 T.C.
879 (1961), involving a tax attorney who purchased a boat which flew
a pennant labeled "1040" and attempted to deduct related expenditures
as business expenses. The Tax Court denied the expenses, maintaining
that a proximate, rather than a remote or incidental, relationship with
one's business must exist. See also J. Wade Harris, 34 T.C.M. (CCH)
1192 (1975) (allowing some yacht deductions for entertainment of pro-
fessional colleagues who had previously referred substantial business);
Donald W. Barber, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1972) (evidencing judicial re-
luctance to conclude that outside activities, such as boat racing, qualify
for deductibility in spite of "indirect benefit" through publicity).
154. See Irving Eisenberg, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 174 (1967), in which an
attorney traveled to Israel, stating that such a trip would expand his
knowledge and enhance his reputation. The court, under the Reed ra-
tionale, found no business relationship, noting that no referrals were de-
rived, and intimated that if the referral standard were applied, an objec-




payer in Reed,155 attended an international law "peace" confer-
ence. Under the agenda test as fashioned and applied in Reed,
neither would qualify for a deduction. Yet one might fortui-
tously derive referrals and qualify for a deductiofh under the
"actual" referral standard even though his intention, prior to at-
tendance, was identical to that of the other. This is clearly an
inequitable result not intended by the Code. Moreover, it would
be necessary to resolve the distressing questions of whether re-
ferrals must result in fees; whether the fees must exceed the
expenditures; and whether any value is attached to the enhance-
ment of one's business reputation and, if so, how it should be
measured.
The exclusive use of the objective educational standard will
best serve the equitable goals of the tax law and eliminate the
confusion which appears inherent in the referral and reputation
analysis. The educational standard also comports more clearly
with the view of convention expenditure deductibility developed
by the judiciary and administrative agencies and incorporated
in the new legislation, and eliminates any distinctions between
conventions and seminars.1 56
B. THE "PRIMARILY RELATED" TEST-TRAVEL EXPENSES
Once a taxpayer meets the sufficient relationship standard,.
convention registration and materials expenses qualify for deduc-
tion. Thereafter, the convention activity, as well as the entire
trip, must be scrutinized under the "primarily related" test. If the
convention by itself fails the "primarily related" test, then only
those expenses properly allocable to the business portion of the
activity are deductible. If the convention meets the requisite
standard, yet the trip when viewed in its entirety fails, the ex-
penses of actual convention attendance will be deductible, but
those for travel will not.157
155. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
156. While the new legislation is applicable to foreign conventions
only, it specifically requires the submission of a convention program
(agenda) as a prerequisite to deductibility. I.R.C. § 274(h) (7) (A) (ii)
& (B) (i). Such a requirement further supports the primacy of 'the
agenda test. See also note 134 supra.
157. This procedure, the double primarily related test, is not clearly
enunciated in the Regulations or in many judicial decisions, frequently
because the cases involve egregious factual circumstances in which nei-
ther could be met. It is submitted, however, that the intent of the Regu-
lations and the evolution of the area's judicial interpretation warrant the
use of such an approach.
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In applying the agenda test, Reed mandates that mere gen-
eral subject matter alone will not suffice; the fact that a con-
vention deals with some aspect of the law will not ensure a de-
duction for a participating attorney. Rather, it must deal with
aspects of the taxpayer's profession or trade frequently en-
countered in his everyday business. Although this standard
must be somewhat relaxed with regard to general annual conven-
tions that serve a group function and cannot cover the business
interests of all participants, the stated nexus, nevertheless, is
that set forth in Reed. Even this seemingly objective standard
poses difficult problems, as evidenced by comparison of special-
ists and generalists and their attendance at different conventions.
A tax practioner attending a three-day convention dealing
exclusively with tax law should definitely be entitled to a de-
duction for expenses incurred. The same tax practioner attend-
ing a no-fault personal injury insurance convention should not
qualify under the Reed approach. A more difficult issue is
whether a generalist's attendance at a specialist's convention
should be treated differently than a specialist's attendance at a
general convention., Drawing the line when the entire conven-
tion does not deal specifically with the participant's duties is also
difficult. Such a determination could be made quantitatively,
that is, a single "relevant" two-hour program in a three-day con-
vention would be insufficient to-.permit deduction of all conven-
tion expenses. An alternative would be to apply the sufficient
relationship test qualitatively and thus allow deduction of direct
convention expenses, including meals and lodging, and apply the
"primarily related" test on a relative time basis determined with
reference to the convention's agenda to determine travel expense
deductibility.
A taxpayer may find himself in any one of the following
situations:
1. He may attend a convention similar to those in Pat-
terson or Rudolph,'5" which presents some substantive ma-
terial relating to his duties, but emphasizes personal activity and
fails to satisfy the "primarily related" test. In this case, the tax-
payer, probably using the Cohan rule,159 may deduct only ex-
158. See text accompanying notes 83-94 & 100-04 supra.
159. Under the Cohan rule, when the evidence indicates that the tax-
payer has incurred a deductible expense, but the exact amount cannot
be determined, the court "should make as close an approximation as it
can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude




penditures of registration and those for meals and lodging allo-
cable to the business portion of the convention. 160
2. He may attend a convention which is primarily related
to his business. All direct expenses are deductible. A second
primarily related test is then applied to the trip as a whole. If
the participant does not use extra days for personal purposes
before or after the convention, then the test for the trip is iden-
tical to that for the convention and all expenses qualify for the
deduction.
3. He may attend a convention primarily related to his busi-
ness and engage in personal activities before or after the conven-
tion. The actual, direct expenses, that is, meals and lodging
while attending the convention, are deductible. The travel ex-
penses to and from the convention (transportation expenses and
meals and lodging) must, however, also pass a primarily related
test applied to the entire trip to be deductible. 16 1
The major difficulty with the "primarily related" test is that
it is not clearly defined. The Regulations emphasize relative time
160. See Thomas v. Patterson, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9321 (N.D. Ala.
1963); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(b) (1); 1.162-5 (e) (1) (1958).
161. This analysis assumes that in the Regulations and judicial opin-
ions, relative time allocation is the controlling standard. As will be dis-
cussed below, alternative constructions exist. Assuming such a standard,
the three categories can be illustrated as follows: the first category is
clearly that of the Rudolph and Patterson decisions in which the business
emphasis and allocable time is minimal. In that type of case, the ex-
penditures for meals and lodging allocable to the business portion of the
convention are deductible. If, instead, the primarily related test is met,
all direct convention expenditures are deductible. Assume a six-day
convention in which the activities commence on a Wednesday and extend
through the following Wednesday, with no business activities transpiring
on the weekend. All other days are totally business oriented with day
long attendance. Thus the "primarily related" test, from a relative time
standpoint is easily surpassed and all direct expenditures, the meals and
lodging Lxpenses, are deductible, notwithstanding the fact that two days
were totally personal. As in situation (2) in the text, if arrival and de-
parture occurred on each respective Wednesday, the trip would be "pri-
marily related" as well and travel expenditures to and from the location
would also be deductible.
Participants may, however, attend a convention and stay over for
other activities. Thus in the Wednesday-to-Wednesday convention hy-
pothetical, if the participant stayed an extra week for solely recreational
purposes, the dual "primarily related" test described in situation (3)
would be applied. The convention portion (the first week) would meet
the "primarily related" standard and insure the deduction of those direct
expenditures, but the subsequent week's expenditures would be personal.
The trip as a whole (9 days personal and 6 days business) would not




allocation between personal and business activity.162 Yet, they
parrot a familiar refrain that the "facts and circumstances" are
controlling and seem to indicate that relative time allocation is
not the exclusive test. The courts have resolved the issue by
balancing various relevant factors. An alternative standard,
more difficult for courts to apply, but which finds some support
in the evolution of the "primarily related" test, is the taxpayer's
subjective intent in participating in the activity.
C. TAXPAYER'S INTENTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE "PRI-
MARILY RELATED" TEST
The Regulations are premised on the need to determine the
taxpayer's motivation, as indicated by the key language: "If the
trip is undertaken . . .for certain specified purposes."'163 Al-
though the Regulations emphasize objective criteria, it is at least
arguable that subjective motivation should be the controlling
factor in determining deductibility. This approach, however, in-
volves a number of problems. One can hypothesize numerous
situations, for example, in which the participant is motivated by
both business and personal concerns-he may plan the trip for
business purposes but subsequently decide to include personal
activity as well or vice versa. One noted commentator points
out another difficulty-many taxpayers actually do not know
their "primary" motivation, having made a decision without eval-
uating the various factors or their respective weights. 6 4 From
a practical standpoint, use of a subjective standard is far too de-
pendent upon taxpayer honesty; moreover, intent would fre-
quently be decided solely on the basis of self-serving testimony.
A mere assertion of business motivation, in theory, would be de-
terminative. 0 5 As is true any time subjective intent is at issue,
a surrogate standard for analysis (objective criteria indicative of
subjective intent) is required. 66 The Regulations purport to
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (2) (1958).
163. Id. § 1.162-2 (a), reprinted in note 14 supra.
164. See Klein, supra note 78, at 1110.
165. Klein notes that a taxpayer would merely state the following
to prevail:
I wanted to go for pleasure but that objective was not quite(though almost)enough to -justify the expense. Then I found
some business that I could conduct at the place chosen for my
vacation. The business was not very important but it was
enough to tip the scales. I would not have gone but for the
business.




establish such surrogates through the "facts and circumstances"
test, while designating relative time allocation as an important
factor. The use of such standards, not uncommon in the tax
law,167 is premised on fostering equitable treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers and enhancing taxpayers' morale, on admin-
istrative convenience and ease of application, and on avoiding the
difficulties of evaluating possibly self-serving testimony.
Despite the difficulties of applying a subjective "but for"
test, however, various commentators1 68 and some legislative
history regarding income tax measures indicate that such a test
has been previously articulated and applied.16 9 The Regulations
proposed in 1956 apparently intended to implement a subjective
approach, 70 although the 1958 Regulations' "primarily related-
facts and circumstances" test established more objective criteria.
The legislative history of the enactment and repeal of section
274 provides additional support for the "but for" test.'1 It could
be argued that the partial repeal of section 274 in 1964 was in-
tended to reinstate the test with regard to domestic but not for-
eign travel. 7 2 Congress, however, in considering the repeal was
apparently concerned not with the "but for" test, but with section
274's complexity and the fact that "it served little purpose."'173
The explicit rejection of the "but for" test when the section was
originally enacted, 74 coupled with the fact that Congress did not
expressly reject the more objective approach of the 1958 Regula-
tions under section 162, may. have indicated an intent to upgrade
167. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967) (establishing
an objective sleep or rest rule); Sanders v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296
(9th Cir. 1971) (disallowing civilian commuting expenses where military
regulations prevented taxpayers from living on base).
168. See Klein, supra note 78, at 1112; Hoffman, How to Arrange
Business-Vacation Trips Now-Under Present T & E Rules, 18 J. TAXA-
ToN 346 (1963). Hoffman maintains in his article that "a taxpayer de-
ducted travel expenses to and from a business destination provided he
could show that he would not have made the trip 'but for' the business
purpose." Id. See also Caplin, The Travel and Entertainment Expense
Problem, 39 TAXEs 947 (1961).
169. See notes 171-77 infra and accompanying text.
170. Proposed regulations in 1956 to section 162, Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 162-2, 21 Fed. Reg. 5092 (1956), gave effect to the "primary purpose"
test as a basis of deductibility. This test has been recognized as generally
referring to "subjective phenomenon," Klein, supra note 78, at 1104-05,
of which the "but for" test would be a part.
171. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
172. For a discussion of the legislative history of section 274, see text
accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
173. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1964).
174. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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the standard (from a "but for" to a "relative time" test), while
requiring only minimum business time (51 percent) to achieve
a total deduction.
Further support for the continuing vitality of the "but for"
test can be found in portions of the Regulations under section
274 that utilize "but for" language and imply its applicability
to section 162.'7 5 Such language, however, may be consistent
with section 162. The "sufficient relationship" test of section 162
requires a nexus similar to the "but for" standard. If the tax-
payer's convention activity meets this standard, his domestic trav-
el expenses will be subject to the "all or nothing" approach of
section 162, while section 274's allocation rules will govern foreign
travel. Since these sections use two different formulas for deter-
mining the amount deductible, use of two different deductibility
standards is appropriate. Thus section 274, although requir-
ing compliance with the "but for-sufficient relationship" test
of section 162, may not require the taxpayer to satisfy the "pri-
marily related" test. Therefore, the "but for" examples may not
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(g), examples 6 & 7 (1963) (emphasis
added) read:
Example (6). F, a self-employed professional man, flew
from New York to Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend a convention
sponsored by a professional society. The trip lasted 3 weeks,
of which 2 weeks were spent on vacation in Europe. F generally
would be regarded as having substantial control over arranging
this business trip. Unless F can establish that obtaining a va-
cation was not a major consideration in determining to make the
trip, the disallowance rules of this section apply.
Example (7). Taxpayer G flew from Chicago to New York
where he spent 6 days on business. He then flew to London
where he conducted business for 2 days. G then flew to Paris
for a 5-day vacation after which he flew back to Chicago, with
a scheduled landing in New York for the purpose of adding and
discharging passengers. G would not have made the trip except
for the business he had to conduct in London. The travel out-
side the United States away from home, including 2 days for
travel en route, exceeded a week and the time devoted to non-
business activities was not less than 25 percent of the total time
on such travel. The 2 days spent traveling from Chicago to New
York and return, and the 6 days spent in New York are disre-
garded for purposes of determining whether the travel outside
the United States away from home exceeded a week and
whether the time devoted to nonbusiness activities was less
than 25 percent of the total time outside the United States away
from home. If G is unable to establish either that he did not have
substantial control over the arranging of the business trip or that
an opportunity for taking a personal vacation was not a major
consideration in his determining to make the trip, 5/9th (5 days
devoted to nonbusiness activities out of a total 9 days outside
the United States away from home on the trip) of the expenses
attributable to transportation and food from New York to Lon-
don and from London to New York will be disallowed (unless
G establishes that a different method of allocation more clearly
1977]
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be inconsistent. 176 The Regulations were intended to provide an
allocation formula to avoid abuse, and although one may main-
tain that the section 274 allocation formula is applicable only af-
ter a "primarily related" test based on time has been met, it
would appear that the section 274 formula eliminates the "pri-
marily related" standard. Moreover, since the Regulations were
adopted prior to the partial repeal of section 274, it cannot be
maintained that the legislature intended the "but for" test to ap-
ply to domestic travel under section 162.177
Although some courts have acknowledged the "but for"
test,178 it is submitted that because of the great potential for
abuse, attendance at conventions and seminars should not be
judged by that standard. Not only does the test involve the
many proof problems inherent in any subjective standard, but
it is inappropriate to give such great weight to the taxpayer's
subjective intent in the context of educational improvement of
one's business skills. Unlike situations such as business dealings
in which client demands require a trip, conventions and seminars
generally lack the urgency and compulsion envisioned by the
"but for" test. 79 The "primarily related" standard, employing
a factor analysis or a time analysis alone, is the better approach
for scrutinizing taxpayers' convention expenditures.
D. RELATIVE TIME ALLOCATION AS DETERMINATIVE OF THE "PRI-
MARILY RELATED" TEST
The major focus of judicial decisions, the Regulations, admin-
istrative pronouncements, and the new legislation in determin-
ing whether attendance at a convention or seminar satisfied the
"primarily related" test is the relative time allocation between
business and personal pursuits.180 Although other factors are
deemed important, as a practical matter they probably become
significant only when the time allocation is borderline. The
reflects the portion of time outside the United States away from
home which is attributable to nonbusiness activity).
176. See Ahmed F. Habeeb, [1976] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1134
(August 19, 1976).
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-(4) (1963) was adopted June 24, 1963, by
T.D. 6659, 1963-2 C.B. 113 and amended September 9, 1964, by T.D. 6758,
1964-2 C.B. 78. The amendment merely removed references to domestic
travel in the examples cited in note 175 supra, but did not otherwise alter
them.
178. See, e.g., Ahmed F. Habeeb, [1976] TAx CT. MEm. DEC. (CCH)
1134 (August 19, 1976); Walter W. Hendrix, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1971).
179. See Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961).
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trend in this area has been to emphasize objective rather than
subjective criteria. As one commentator stated, "[t] his approach
seems about as objective, as easily administerable, and apparently
as fair a surrogate test as one can imagine."'' Even under this
objective test, however, questions arise regarding the requisite
percentage of business time and the standard for quantifying
business time.
The Regulations hypothesize a six-week trip-five of which
are personal and one business. 18 2 Under any standard such a
trip would clearly be primarily personal. Unless a "but for"
standard were applicable, deduction of such travel expendi-
tures would be unjustified. In more realistic situations, the req-
uisite percentage of business time is more difficult to determine.
The term "primarily" may connote "more than majority"-51
percent (a mere preponderance)-or, instead, may dictate some
greater or lesser percentage. No clear standard has been devel-
oped for resolving this issue, but it would seem that a prepond-
erance of business time, greater than 50 percent, should suffice.
No case as yet has involved such a close allocation, probably be-
cause of administrative policy-making and the small amounts of
tax involved. Were deductibility of travel expenditures not an
all or nothing proposition, the resolution of the issue would
not be so critical, but the harshness of the rule may itself
constitute a reason for its lax enforcement. In view of the repeal
of the fairer allocation standard of section 274 for domestic trav-
el,'8 3 a preponderance of business time should satisfy the Reg-
ulation's relative time allocation criteria. 8 4  Further, this stand-
180. The Regulations emphasize this factor but apparently do not
make it exclusive. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (2) (1958). Contrasting
the time allocation language in section 1.162-2(b) (2) with that in the
Regulations at section 1.162-5 (d) & (e) further indicates the nonexclu-
sivity of the time allocation factor. The latter Regulations make the rel-
ative time comparison determinative, and indicate that the Treasury will
specify when time allocation is to be exclusive.
181. Klein, supra note 78, at 1116. See also Halperin, supra note 30,
at 920 ("Therefore, despite the lack of theoretical support for it, alloca-
tion as now required for certain foreign travel is probably the most rea-
sonable approach to all travel expenditures.")
The use of such a standard has not always been praised. See Peo-
ples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924, (Ct. Cl. 1967) (per
curiam), where the court disdainfully referred to making a time com-
parison as a "fruitless game." Id. at 929.
182. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (2) (1958).
183. See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
184. See also Hoffman, supra note 168. The Regulations at section
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ard should be controlling notwithstanding other factors (as in
the Patterson factor analysis approach),185 since it is the key to
resolving the "primarily related" issue. Finally, business time
should be determined with reference to the trip, convention, or
seminar, disregarding travel time if the taxpayer employs the
quickest or most direct mode of transportation. If, however,
transportation that affords sightseeing or recreational opportun-
ities is used, then this time also should be included in computing
the relative time allocation.
The method of computing the time percentage is a more diffi-
cult issue. The percentage could be computed on an hourly basis
(with the attendant problem of selecting the appropriate base-
24-hour day, 8-hour day), a daily basis, or by some other method.
This difficulty is further highlighted when one observes the spe-
cific, generous rules of section 274. Section 274 requires an allo-
cation based on a per day basis for foreign travel. If section
162 required an hourly determination, anomalous results could
occur when the convention or seminar was held outside the
United States. The 1976 legislation modifying section 274, how-
ever, in effect utilizes an hourly standard for computing half days
and full days,186 and thus any potential conflict or anomaly is
minimized. 87
As evidenced by the recent legislation and judicial 8 8 and ad-
ministrative use of this approach, an hourly allocation standard
is sound, 8 9 for it guards against convention scheduling that em-
1.274-4(d) (2) utilize a per day time standard, but provide that a tax-
payer may establish and utilize a different method of allocation "which
more clearly reflects" the time usage.
185. See text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
186. See I.R.C. § 274(h), set forth at note 133 supra.
187. Any anomaly with the foreign travel Regulations that may re-
main when an hourly test is used for the primarily related test can bejustified as an administrative decision to facilitate audits and taxpayer
computation of deductible amounts.
188. The Fifth Circuit used an hourly comparison in Patterson v.
Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961). See
also Esfandiar Kadivar, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1973); Rev. Rul. 74-292,
1974-1 C.B. 43.
189. That is not to say that the hourly standard is without problems.
On remand in Patterson v. Thomas, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9321 (N.D. Ala.
1963), the district court, in determining the allocable amount of indirect
expenses incurred while attending the convention, concluded that fifty
hours of a total of ninety hours were spent in business activities (thirty-
two of the fifty hours were for sleep). This apparently contradicts the
Fifth Circuit's statement that "at the most five hours out of the three
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phasizes recreation and sightseeing under the guise of regular
business functions. A convention's agenda of three morning ses-
sions during a four-day period, for example, would qualify under
a daily test, yet fail the hourly standard. The more rigorous
hourly approach thus provides greater protection against poten-
tial abuse, and should continue to be used.
In computing the relative time allocation on an hourly basis,
the convention's agenda should govern, bhsed on an eight-hour
work day.190 Attempts to justify additional hours by counting
personal contacts and business conversations should not succeed.
Although the Patterson court indicated that a showing of busi-
ness related contacts would have made its decision more diffi-
cult,'L ' this factor should be discarded as too dependent upon
a subjective state of mind and too prone to distortion by fortui-
tous circumstances. 1 92
Additionally, the generous rules for time computation set out
in section 274193 should be ignored in applying the "primarily
related" test. One technique that is subject to abuse in conven-
tion scheduling is the "intervening weekend." If the convention
period includes a weekend during which no business is scheduled,
the days would be classified as "business" under the section 274
travel Regulations. 94 Under the "primarily related" standard,
however, weekend hours should be deemed personal and enter
the formula accordingly, especially when such intervals are spe-
cifically scheduled to maximize time for recreation.
An additional prerequisite to deducting such expenditures
should be proof of the taxpayer's actual attendance at the sched-
and one-half days were spent in formal business meetings," 289 F.2d at
113. The discrepancy can perhaps be explained as a more liberal hourly
standard applied to direct expenditures-including sleep time as business
time-than that employed under the "primarily related" test for inciden-
tal expenditures.
190. See also Halperin, supra note 30, at 921; Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2
C.B. 52, in which "sleep" time is used in computing the disallowed,
personal amount. However, it should be noted that the new section
274 (h) utilizes a six hour day.
191. 289 F.2d at 113.
192. See also Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924, 926(Ct. Cl. 1967), noting the "cross-fertilization" of ideas intended by the
convention sponsors.
193. For example, no allocation is required if duration is less than
one week, and classification as a "business day" is permitted if the tax-
payer's presence is required even though nonbusiness time exceeds busi-
ness time. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (ii) (1963).
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (v) (1963).
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uled meetings and programs. 95 The proposed standard for de-
ductibility would obviously be circumvented if a mere presenta-
tion of the convention's agenda sufficed. Conventions are plagued
by poor attendance at afternoon sessions or pre-weekend, final
day sessions. 190 Proof of actual attendance, such as sign-in sheets
or notes taken during the sessions, should be required for allow-
ance of a deduction; a representation of attendance is required
under the new legislation. 197
E. LOCATION OF THE CONVENTION OR SEMINAR
Although relative time allocation is the most important, if
not determinative, factor in deciding whether the convention is
primarily related to business, the courts and the Service fre-
quently pay lip service to the importance of the convention's
location.198 Location is the aspect of convention activity most
subject to abuse. As previously mentioned,199 conventions and
seminars are sometimes held in places far from the participants'
residences or places of business, and an individual's decision to at-
tend may be heavily influenced by the location. Location can
thus constitute an objective indication of the taxpayer's motiva-
tion.
195. See Osborn, Insurance Convention Expenses: What are the Tax
Rules for the Insurance Salesman and his Company? 27 CLU JouRNAL
22, 26 (1973).
196. Obviously, no disallowance would be made if a participant at-
tended only specific topics applicable to his trade or business, provided
his arrival and departure were properly timed. The problem area con-
cerns those cases where the participant considers only two of the three
days relevant, and the irrelevant day straddles the relevant days. While
in some factual situations the use of the general standard may appear
less fair, the desirability of objective criteria and avoiding disputes with
regard to every session or portion thereof requires the application of this
standard to all. Additionally, nonbusiness time will not result in disal-
lowance unless it constitutes a preponderance of time and thus should
seldom create hardships. With regard to the abusive attendance pattern,
see Seattle Times, August 14, 1974, at 2, col. 6, describing the problem
of achieving quorums for meetings on Presidential impeachment issues
during the 1974 American Bar Association meeting in Honolulu, HawaiL
Apparently, the conventioneers were more occupied with the scenic and
recreational pleasures of the Hawaiian beaches than attending scheduled
meetings.
197. See I.R.C. § 274(h) (7) (B) (ii).
198. See Rudolph v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960),
aff'd, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), cert. dis-
missed, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); Thomas v. Patterson, 189 F. Supp. 230
(N.D. Ala. 1959), rev'd, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837
(1961); Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961); IRS News Release No.
IR-394 [1961] 7 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) f 4601 (August 3, 1961).
199. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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The frequent citation and discussion of locale is usually no
more than additional justification for the result reached by the
trier of fact, for in most cases the relative time factor alone has
dictated the result.20 0 The locale factor would probably become
significant only in cases where time spent on business approached
50 percent. Cases considering locale in a factor analysis, how-
ever, must be distinguished from the cases in which the location
was so unreasonable as to be inconsistent with the "ordinary and
necessary" test of section 162.201 Under the latter doctrine, the
expenditures may be denied entirely, notwithstanding favorable
time allocation and other positive factors.
The Patterson and Rudolph decisions generated concern
about possible loss of business in the entertainment, hotel, and
restaurant industries. This prompted the Service to issue a news
release which stated: "[A]n analysis of a large group of cases
from all parts of the country involving a variety of travel and
entertainment expenses did not reveal that any expenses were
disallowed merely because of the site of a convention or meet-
ing."20 2 A resort location need not necessarily result in a disal-
lowance of expenditures or even be an adverse objective factor.
A resort, for instance, may be the only location capable of accom-
modating the number of participants.20 3 It may also be the site
most conducive to maximum efficiency (a quiet, reflective en-
vironment) or the facility most centrally located to the partici-
pants' residences. Technological facilities or specialized equip-
ment unavailable at other locations may also be present.
Nevertheless, the news release should not be interpreted to
mean that any location whatsoever will suffice or that it may
not be a negative factor in the analysis. If the site selection can-
not be justified, the availability of recreation and entertainment
may well indicate personal, rather than business, motivation.
And, while even a "negative" location may not override a favor-
able time allocation in a factor analysis, it may be an overriding
limitation under the "ordinary and necessary" test discussed be-
200. See, e.g., Thomas v. Patterson, 189 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ala. 1959),
rev'd, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961); text ac-
companying notes 93-96 supra. But see Rudolph v. United States, 189
F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960), afrd, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
368 U.S. 913 (1961), cert. dismissed, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); text accompany-
ing notes 102-04 supra.
201. See text accompanying notes 79-82 & 88-97 supra.
202. IRS News Release, supra note 198. See also Osborn, supra note
195.
203. See Thomas v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 108, 113 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).
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low. 20 4 In short, the fact that the Service found no case that
held a resort locale alone sufficient to deny the deduction of ex-
penditures does not mean that such a case could not arise.
F. ADDITIONAL FACTORS
If a Patterson factor analysis is used to ascertain whether
a trip was primarily related to business, other minor factors, be-
sides time and locale, may be considered. The "facts and circum-
stances" of each case are controlling and only in borderline situa-
tions with minimally adverse or favorable time allocations might
these minor factors sustain or deny a deduction. Frequently,
they are discussed and cited merely as additional support for the
court's conclusion.
One of these factors is whether a spouse or other family
member accompanies the participant,20 5 since this may indicate
that the educational or business purpose is not the primary rea-
son for attending. If the participant is an employee, his em-
ployer's motivation for authorizing and underwriting the activity
may indicate the convention's basic purpose and whether the em-
ployer has concluded that it has educational value.206 A partici-
pant's previous attendance may also be relevant since, if the tax-
payer has long been a member of the organization yet only at-
tends conventions at desirable locations, an inference that his
motivation is personal may be drawn.2 7 Finally, the means of
transportation employed, 20 8 the taxpayer's familiarity with the
locale,20 9 and the time of year, in view of the location, during
which the convention is held,210 may constitute objective criteria
by which to evaluate the taxpayer's intent.
G. LOcALE-"ORDNARY AND NECESSARY" TEST AS A PREREQUISITE
TO THE APPLICATION OF A PATTERSON FACTOR ANALYSIS
A prerequisite to the application of the "primarily related"
204. See text accompanying notes 211-32 infra.
205. See Rev.Rul. 56-168, 1956-1 C.B. 93.
206. See Thomas v. Patterson, 189 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ala. 1959),
rev'd, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961). But see
note 95 supra and accompanying text.
207. Cf. Walter M. Sheldon, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, affd, 299 F.2d 48
(9th Cir. 1962).
208. See Robert H. Cowing, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 696 (1969).
209. See DeWitt K. Burnham, 17 T.C.ML (CCH) 240 (1958).
210. One need only survey available conventions and seminars to
conclude that few transpire during the "undesirable months," except at
very desirable locations. See also Rev. Rul. 56-168, 1956-1 C.B. 93.
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standard, recognized by some judicial opinions,21 1 is whether the
convention site selected bears any relation whatsoever to the or-
ganization's membership and purposes. If it does not, then the
"ordinary and necessary" test of section 162 is not met, and the
expenditures should be denied, notwithstanding any other favor-
able factors.
Both the courts and the Service have frequently ignored or
failed to articulate this premise. Location may be only a factor
if it is "reasonable." If totally unreasonable (in contrast to "too
recreational"), however, the locale should preclude deductibility.
Surely all would agree that expenses of an annual convention
of the Iowa Certified Public Accountants in the Virgin Islands,
should not be deductible even if a great deal of business is con-
ducted, if no business purpose for choosing that location can be
shown.
The Fifth Circuit in Patterson considered the convention's
locale as only one factor in resolving the deductibility issue.
However, the district court in Rudolph v. United States,21 2 citing
the lower court's favorable Patterson decision, noted that the lo-
cation of the convention involved in Patterson may have been
related to the insurance company's business:
It does not appear where the office of the company is-the in-
surance company-it does not appear where the territory of the
company is. So far as the information is concerned, much of its
business might be around and about Fort Monroe. Therefore,
selection of that place would be in line with ordinary business
economy.213
Thus the Rudolph court implied that the location selected for
the Patterson convention may have met the "ordinary or necess-
ary" standard of section 162.
The Rudolph court, however, found no such relationship in
the case before it and specifically held, based solely on locale,
that the participant's endeavors were personal. The court con-
cluded that the inappropriate site selection was prima facie evi-
dence of personal motivation:
We will assume that the company here has a larger part of its
business in Texas and adjoining states. Primarily, the place of
the home office would be the place where the agents would be
called to as a business proposition to receive instructions and to
be taught.
211. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 213-20 infra.
212. 189 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), cert. dismissed, 370 U.S. 269 (1962).
213. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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Suppose there was a lot of business down and around San
Antonio. To break the monotony to a degree, the convention
might be held in San Antonio, or in Houston, or might be held
in Oklahoma City. But what business reason is there for hold-
ing a convention in a place as far away as New York; and cer-
tainly, what business reason is there for holding a convention in
Havana, Cuba. It was not held down there for educational pur-
poses in insurance.
Assume that it was to a degree; what was the primary purpose
of the trip: It was a reward, or a bonus given to the employees
for excellence in service. If it was purely educational, it might
be held here in Dallas and those who did not attain such a high
rating might have the benefits of the program at the conven-
tion.214
Other courts dealt with the reasonableness of a locale in a
similar manner. The courts in Hoover2 1 5 and Kadivar21 6 (by im-
plication) disallowed seminar expenses because the taxpayer
could have acquired the educational benefits by more rational
means. The major indication of the "irrationality" of the means
utilized was the unreasonable location of the seminars. The
courts concluded that this irrationality was evidence of a per-
sonal motivation that precluded deductibility. While this ap-
proach is consistent with the Code and the Regulations, it neces-
sitates making a judgment about the taxpayer's subjective intent
that a more direct approach would avoid.
This more direct approach rests simply on the fundamental
requirement of deductibility that an expense be an "ordinary and
necessary" business expense.2 17 The courts have struggled to de-
fine and apply this phrase in accordance with congressional in-
tent, and have concluded that the section 162 phraseology in-
cludes a reasonableness limitation.21 8 The Sixth Circuit held:
Such payments are made proper deductions by the statute, but
with respect to them there is no express statutory provision
limiting them to a reasonable amount, as is the case of payments
of compensation for personal services. However, the element
of reasonableness is inherent in the phrase "ordinary and neces-
sary.'
2 1 9
An unreasonable expense should thus be completely disallowed
since it would not comply with the "ordinary and necessary"
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
217. I.R.C. § 162(a).
218. United States v. Haskel Eng'r & Supply Co., 380 F.2d 786 (9th
Cir. 1967).




standard. Although one case indicates the contrary and would
allow the "reasonable portion of the expenditure, 2 2 0 this ap-
proach appears improper, for the statutory language and accom-
panying Regulations on conventions and seminars dictate an all
or nothing approach.
When applied to conventions and seminars, this limitation
requires that some rational connection between the site selected
and the organization must exist. Unreasonable locale should not
merely make a deduction suspect, but should result in automatic
disallowance. The requisite connection with the organization
may vary-the usual test would be whether the convention site
was close to the participants' homes or businesses or centrally
located to accommodate members from different areas. When
a particular location uniquely serves the organization's purposes,
however, the fact that none of its members reside there should
not be controlling. Historians visiting historical sites, for ex-
ample, or population control experts researching socio-economic
data would fall within this exception. The focal point should
be whether the locale is an essential and indispensable aspect
of the meeting's purpose. Employee conventions sponsored by
the employer could logically be held near the sponsor's business
offices or corporate headquarters or possibly in an area in which
it conducts a substantial portion of its business.221
There is some support for the argument that location is not
an overriding limitation on convention deductibility in certain
broad language in administrative rulings and judicial opinions
regarding education expenses. In Revenue Ruling 60-97222 the
Service stated that an individual "will not be denied a de-
duction solely because attendance at the institution of his
choice resulted in greater [travel] expenditures that he would
have made if he had attended another institution. 2 23 Were this
220. See United States v. Haskel Eng'r & Supply Co., 380 F.2d 786,
788-89 (9th Cir. 1967).
221. Certain portions of the Regulations and some administrative andjudicial statements in the educational area may arguably undercut such
a reasonableness limitation on convention locale, but upon close analysis,
these positions are distinguishable. A hypothetical example in the sec-
tion 274 Regulations, for example, describes a foreign professional con-
vention, and could be liberally interpreted to indicate the Treasury's lack
of concern for location. A more realistic interpretation of the example,
however, is that the issue of locale was simply not addressed. See exam-
ple 6, note 175 supra.
222. 1960-1 C.B. 69.
223. Id. at 75.
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statement applied to convention site selection, it would seem to
indicate that any site would suffice if the convention's agenda
were properly related to the taxpayer's business. In John C.
Ford224 the Tax Court permitted a deduction for the expenses
of attending a Norwegian university. The court maintained
that "[i]t is inconsequential that the petitioner chose to acquire
the additional education to improve his skills by attending a
university in a foreign country rather than one in the United
States."2 25 Again, if this were applied to conventions, site would
appear to be virtually irrelevant in determining deductibility.
Educational seminars and conventions, however, can be
readily distinguished from the activity considered in the Ruling
and in Ford. The time spent at conventions and seminars is
short, and where the location is exotic or remote, the taxpayer
may be simply indulging in a vacation. Long-term, educational
activities do not present the same opportunity and, more-
over, the Service is most hesitant, on policy grounds, to dictate
site selection criteria on such a personal issue as the choice of
an educational institution.
A further distinction between an individual's choice of an
educational institution and a group's selection of a convention
or seminar site is the purpose that the locale serves. The conven-
tion site is normally a mere gathering place for the membership.
Thus, subject to the exceptions discussed above,226 many locales
will suffice and a "reasonableness" requirement is sensible. But
an individual selects an academic institution because it is pecu-
liarly suited to his needs. This subjective determination more
closely resembles the exceptions than the general rule, articu-
lated above.
Self-employed taxpayers might argue that the Rudolph and
Patterson decisions 227 are limited to conventions and seminars
sponsored by an employer and the unreasonable locale analysis
for professional groups should neither be applicable nor deter-
n-inative. The Regulations, however, under both sections 162 and
274 stipulate that self-employed individuals' convention deduc-
tions are to be scrutinized in the same manner as those of employ-
ees. 22 8 Moreover, although the Rudolph and Patterson taxpayers
224. 56 T.C. 1300 (1971).
225. Id. at 1307.
226. See notes 220-21 supra and accompanying text.
227. For a discussion of Patterson and Rudolf, see text accompanying
notes 84-99 & 100-04 supra.
228. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(d) (1958); 1.274-4(a) (1963).
[Vol. 61:253
CONVENTION EXPENSES
maintained that their attendance was compulsory, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the analysis should focus on the employee's moti-
vation in attending, that is, whether he had satisfied the "primar-
ily related" test. The employer's intention was irrelevant. Thus,
although a self-employed participant in a non-employer-spon-
sored convention might argue that the "reasonable locale" rule
should not apply to him because he did not participate in the site
selection, his situation is clearly less compelling than that in Pat-
terson and Rudolph. There should be no difference in treatment.
Additional responses to a participant's argument that he had no
control over the locale are: (1) as a member of that group, he
elects the officers or representatives who select the sites and thus
an agency relationship exists; 229 and (2) similar to the Patterson
factor analysis, the association or group is analogous to an em-
ployee's employer, and the reasonable locale test should be ap-"
plied accordingly.
Thus, a clear limitation on the deductibility of convention
and seminar expenses should be that the activity be reasonably
carried out.230  Even if the taxpayer satisfied the Regulation's
"primarily related" and "sufficient relationship" tests, the ex-
pense deduction may be disallowed under the general "ordinary
and necessary" rules if the activity is conducted in some extraor-
dinary fashion. Regardless of the educational benefits derived
from a convention, it is uncommon and unreasonable for tax-
payers to travel to distant places to enhance their business
skills. In Richard Seibold,2 3 1 for example, the court noted that
although the taxpayer's school awarded required credits for his
European travel, the fact that the ordinary or accepted method
for teachers to fulfill such requirements was by attending sum-
mer school sessions precluded his deducting the expenses of his
trip.
As a general standard, deductibility of conventions or semin-
ars held at distant locales should be limited to situations in which
the location has direct substantive and geographical connection
to the meeting and its membership. Distant educational or con-
vention experiences, when directly related to the participant's
229. Compare the substantial control test of Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4 (f)
(5) (i) (1963).
230. It is interesting to note that Canada, faced with the same con-
vention abuse problem, finally codified an administratively-imposed rea-
sonableness limitation. See MmnsTRY or FINANcE, CANADI~x PROPOSALS
FOR TAx REFORMu 15 (1969); Income Tax Act, c. 63 [1970-71-72] CAN.
STAT. § 20(10).
231. 31 T.C. 1017 (1959).
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field of expertise or when first-hand observation is required and
not attainable closer to home, would support a deduction. 232 Even
these exceptions, however, should be closely scrutinized. For
many organizational meetings, it would be more sensible to bring
experts to a reasonably located convention site rather than to
take the entire group to the experts' distant locale. Allowing
individual taxpayers to deduct their expenses on the ground that
the organization chose the location should not be tolerated. Un-
less a compelling reason can be adduced for choosing a site, the
expenses may be disallowed as not within the "ordinary and nec-
essary" test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Business conventions and educational seminars have become
not only commonplace but essential in modern business society.
The judiciary and the Treasury department have recognized their
importance and formulated various standards for the deductibil-
ity of expenditures incurred in attending. While the validity of
deductibility is no longer contested, the standards governing de-
ductibility are still vague and uncertain.
Convention activities and educational seminars which are
similar in nature should be governed by the same standards for
deductibility to prevent mere labels from dictating disparate tax
consequences. The Regulati6ns require that a "sufficient relation-
ship" exist between the activity and the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness. In the past, deductions for convention and seminar activi-
ties have been grounded on the educational theory, the referral
theory, or a combination of the two. The educational benefit
that the participant derives from the activity is generally empha-
sized; it is determined by evaluating the relationship of the
agenda to the taxpayer's business, and is based on sound tax pol-
icy. When this standard has been met, the taxpayer is entitled
to deduct the direct expenditures-convention registration and
materials expenses-incurred in attendance.
Once the "sufficient relationship" test has been met, the con-
vention activity and the trip in its entirety are each scrutinized
for compliance with the "primarily related" test, in order to as-
certain the deductibility of expenditures for transportation,
meals, and lodging. Some conflicting authority exists which sub-
stantiates the use of either a subjective "but for" standard or
232. See Duncan v. Bookwalter, 216 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1963);
Bruce B. Steinmann, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1251 (1971).
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an objective standard to determine whether the participant's mo-
tivation for attending was "primarily related" to his business.
In order to minimize uncertainty and reduce evidentiary difficul-
ties, the preferable approach, which also has the greatest judicial
and administrative support, is the objective standard. As re-
flected by the Patterson decision, this requires an analysis of
various factors that may indicate motivation-including the re-
lative time allocation between business and personal activities,
the location of the activity, the presence of the participant's fam-
ily, opportunities for vacationing, and so on. Notwithstanding
the innumerable factors which might be relevant to the issue, the
primary and determinative factor should be the relative time al-
location, calculated on an hourly basis. Because the potential for
abuse in these areas is great, this standard, which is the most
objective factual analysis available, is warranted and other fac-
tors should be considered only in close cases. The resolution of
the "primarily related" test with regard to both the convention
and the trip as a whole will determine the deductibility of the
total travel expenses.
An overriding limitation on these activities, founded upon
the "ordinary and necessary" standard of section 162, however,
is that they be held at reasonable locations that are consistent
with members' residences or the organization's purposes. Unless
such a relationship can be shown, the location should be deemed
unreasonable and no deductions at all should be allowed. Judi-
cial authority exists for this proposition, and some recent legis-
lative proposals reflect it. A codification of this limitation, applic-
able to domestic as well as to foreign activity, should be enacted
to add certainty and clarity to the tax law. If the government
is to subsidize educational seminars and conventions by allowing
taxpayers to deduct their expenses, it must insist that such activi-
ties be conducted in a reasonable manner, thereby insuring that
public funds are not squandered on taxpayers' vacations.
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